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MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF AN ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN ON CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS:
FACING THE PROBLEM AND
CONTEMPLATING SOLUTIONS
Grace Soyon Lee*
Charitable giving has been a foundation of American society almost
since the nation began, but the issue of how such giving should be
treated for tax purposes has been the subject of frequent debate.  Schol-
ars have proposed various theories explaining why the positive effects of
this deduction on both donors and donees outweigh the negative impact
on government coffers of this tax expenditure, although many still criti-
cize certain features of the deduction in its current form.  However, one
area of this research that has previously been neglected is how the chari-
table sector is affected by changes to the economy at large.  Contribu-
tions to charitable organizations tend to decline during an economic
downturn, and such a decline may be catastrophic to the charitable sec-
tor.  In particular, an economic downturn can affect charitable organiza-
tions in three different ways.  First, some organizations may experience
an increase in donations but simultaneously experience an increase in
demand for their services.  Other organizations may experience an in-
crease in demand for their services without experiencing an accompany-
ing increase in donations.  Finally, some organizations may experience
such a steep decline in donations that their very survival is put in jeop-
ardy, regardless of whether the demand for their services increases.  In
order to meet the recessionary needs of all three types of organizations,
the government should: 1) convert the current charitable deduction to a
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refundable credit that is available to all taxpayers; 2) provide a tax
credit to employers who second their employers to work for charitable
organizations; and 3) provide direct funding to those charities that can
demonstrate dire financial need.
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INTRODUCTION
For almost one hundred years, the United States federal government
has encouraged charitable giving by allowing taxpayers to deduct dona-
tions made to certain charitable organizations.1  Since that time, Con-
1 War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917),
reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS,
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gress has made various changes to the deduction, including changes in
the amount taxpayers may deduct, which organizations may receive de-
ductible contributions, and who is eligible to take the deduction.2  Cur-
rently, taxpayers who itemize their deductions on their tax returns may
deduct contributions made to certain charitable organizations that have
registered with the Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”).3  The
amount a taxpayer may deduct is generally limited to 50% of that tax-
payer’s adjusted gross income, although in some cases the deduction is
limited to 20% or 30% of adjusted gross income.4  Although taxpayers
may not deduct the value of the services they provide when they volun-
teer with a charitable organization, they may be able to deduct some of
the costs incurred in providing those services.5
Scholars have debated the benefits and drawbacks of the deduction
since its inception, and both proponents and critics have focused largely
on the effect the deduction has both on taxpayers’ incentives to give to
charitable organizations and on those organizations’ ability to sustain
themselves through donations.  While some examine the effect that the
1938–1861, 944 (1938). See also Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduc-
tion: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061–62 (2003).
Originally, the deduction was intended to sustain previous levels of charitable giving in the
face of the recently implemented income tax. COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND
PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA 18 (1975) [hereinafter GIVING IN AMERICA] .  Addition-
ally, it was believed that income used for charitable purposes did not enrich the giver and
therefore did not deserve to be taxed. Id.
2 See, e.g., War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330
(1917), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
LAWS, 1938–1861, 944 (1938) (implementing the charitable deduction and setting a cap of
15% of net income); Act of July 8, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-455, § 4(a), 66 Stat. 442, 443 (1952)
(raising the cap on the deduction from 15 to 20%); Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272,
Title II, § 209(a), 78 Stat. 43 (1964) (extending the deduction to include any organization that
receives a substantial part of their support from the general public or a governmental unit); Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, Title II, § 201(a)(1), 83 Stat. 551 (1969) (setting the
ceiling at 50% for all taxpayers); Economic Tax Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
34, Title I, § 121(a), 95 Stat. 196 (1981) (extending the deduction to include non-itemizers);
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title II, § 286(b)(1), 96
Stat. 570 (1982) (extending the deduction to athletic organizations); Tax Act of 1986, Pub.L.
99-514, Title I, § 142(d), 100 Stat. 2120 (1986) (repealing extension of the deduction to cer-
tain travel expenses); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203,
§ 10711(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1330-457 (1987) (disallowing deduction for contributions made to
organizations involved in political activities).
3 I.R.C. § 170 (2010).  Taxpayers may not deduct contributions made to specific indi-
viduals, contributions to nonqualified organizations, contributions from which the taxpayer
receives financial or economic benefits, or contributions of partial interests in property. Id.
Taxpayers who contribute property to such organizations may generally deduct the fair market
value of such property at the time of the contribution. Id. Many state income tax laws allow
for a similar deduction. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE
GIVING 12 (1985).
4 I.R.C. § 170 (2010).
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (2010).
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deduction has on donors,6 others look at the impact the deduction has on
either the organizations themselves7 or donors’ ability to direct govern-
ment funds to particular organizations.8  However, little attention has
been paid to the effect that an economic downturn has on the incentives
provided to donors and, consequently, on the charitable sector.
This Article addresses those deficiencies by looking at how differ-
ent types of organizations are affected by an economic downturn and
how charitable giving can be stimulated during such times.  Unsurpris-
ingly, charitable contributions tend to decline during a recession.  At the
same time, many organizations will experience an increase in demand for
their services.  In some cases, donors may anticipate the effects that a
stagnant economy will have on charitable organizations and try to miti-
gate these effects on their own; for example, contributions to homeless
shelters, animal shelters, and food banks (“high-profile” organizations)
actually increase when the economy declines; the challenge these organi-
zations face lies in ensuring that the increase in donations is sufficient to
keep up with the heightened demand.9  However, some organizations,
such as domestic violence shelters and legal aid providers (“hidden-
need” organizations), experience an increase in demand for their services
that is not accompanied by a simultaneous increase in donations; these
organizations must face the challenge of meeting increased demand on a
reduced budget.10  Finally, organizations dedicated to the arts (“low-pro-
file” organizations) may not experience an increase in demand during a
recession but nonetheless suffer as donors shift their contributions to
high-profile organizations, with the result that some of these organiza-
tions are forced to drastically reduce their operations or even shut their
doors altogether.11
Part I of this Article examines the effect that an economic downturn
has on charitable organizations and concludes that the effects are both
severe and diverse enough to warrant measures designed at increasing
6 See, e.g., Williams D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309, 311 (1972) (discussing measurement theory).
7 See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1393, 1416 (1988) (discussing subsidy theory).
8 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 388 (1998) (dis-
cussing choice theory).
9 Ctr. on Philanthropy at Ind. Univ., Giving During Recessions and Economic Slow-
downs, Giving USA Spotlight 11 (Issue 3, 2008) [hereinafter GIVING DURING RECESSIONS],
available at http://www.ruotoloassoc.com/Spotlight3-2008Final.pdf. See MARY KAY, INC.,
“MARY KAY TRUTH ABOUT ABUSE” SURVEY: NAT’L FINDINGS FROM THIRD SURVEY OF DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 3–6 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter TRUTH
ABOUT ABUSE], available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/marykay_truthaboutabusesurvey_
2011.pdf (demonstrating increased demand).
10 See TRUTH ABOUT ABUSE, supra note 9, at 3–6; LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT 6–7 (2011).
11 See GIVING DURING RECESSIONS, supra note 9, at 14. R
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financial assistance to charitable organizations.  Part II then considers
what guidelines should be used when designing such measures by look-
ing at the theories justifying the charitable deduction and criticisms of
the deduction in its current form; this part also asks whether such mea-
sures should be aimed at helping all charitable organizations equally.
Part III looks more closely at past proposals to stimulate giving among
individual donors and asks whether, if enacted, those proposals could
offer sufficient aid charitable organizations during an economic down-
turn.  Ultimately, this part concludes that two proposals provide the
greatest potential for providing assistance to charitable organizations dur-
ing an economic downturn: converting the deduction to a credit that is
available to all taxpayers and providing employers with a tax credit for
seconding their employees to work for these organizations.  However,
because such measures may be insufficient to provide assistance to low-
profile and hidden-need organizations, charitable organizations should
also be given the option of applying for direct governmental assistance
based on previous levels of funding.  Finally, Part IV examines some
possible criticisms of these proposals.
I. THE EFFECT OF AN ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON CHARITABLE GIVING
While it is hardly surprising that charitable giving declines during
recessionary years as the economy slows, charitable giving actually falls
at a greater rate than gross domestic product (“GDP”) during an eco-
nomic downturn.  For example, during the most recent recession, charita-
ble giving fell by over $11 billion—roughly 4%—between 2008 and
2009, even though GDP declined by only 2.3% during that time.12  The
12 Michelle Nichols, U.S. Charitable Giving Approaches $300 billion in 2011, REUTERS,
(June 19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/19/us-usa-charity-idUS-
BRE85I05T20120619; Gross Domestic Product (GPD): Current-dollar and “Real” GDP, BU-
REAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp.  Although
charitable giving will gradually increase as the economy recovers, such giving tends to lag a
year or more behind economic growth and generally takes three to five years to reach pre-
recession levels. THE CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA 2010: THE AN-
NUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2009, at 23 [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
The strain currently felt by charitable organizations is typical of what happens during an eco-
nomic downturn, as evidenced by similar changes in giving that occurred in the 1970s, during
the middle of another recession. See GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 70 (“[W]hile private R
giving is still large in the United States by comparison with other countries, and while it has
grown continuously in current dollar measurements ever since estimates of philanthropy have
been compiled, it has not kept pace with the growth of the economy over the last decade, and
in constant, uninflated dollars, it has fallen off absolutely in the last few years”).  At that time,
the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (the “Filer Commission”) con-
cluded that non-profits faced particular challenges during a recession because so many of their
activities involved the provision of services rather than the manufacture of products. Id. at 83.
The rising costs of labor left non-profits at a disadvantage in comparison to other sectors of the
economy during a recession, particularly since those other sectors could take advantage of
labor-saving technology and economies of scale. Id.  These strains continue today, when “80
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reasons for this drop in giving can be found by considering individual
taxpayer behavior.
Unsurprisingly, “[T]he more financially secure [an individual] feels,
the more is given to charity, not just in absolute amounts but also as a
percentage of income and net worth;” conversely, an increase in financial
insecurity leads to additional declines in charitable giving, for the follow-
ing reasons.13  First, a decrease in income may send a taxpayer into a
lower tax bracket, at which point the charitable subsidy becomes less
valuable to him or her.14  Second, a decrease in income may lead a tax-
payer to make changes that affect his or her ability to itemize his or her
deductions.  For example, the taxpayer may end up selling his or her
home and renting instead, which means he or she can no longer deduct
mortgage interest payments.15  A loss of the ability to itemize deductions
also means a loss of the tax incentive provided by the charitable deduc-
tion.16  Third, an individual facing a sudden and unexpected decrease in
income, as a result of a job loss for example, may be forced to allocate
all his or her income to necessities and may drastically reduce or elimi-
nate discretionary expenses, including charitable donations.17
Finally, even if a taxpayer’s income does not actually decline, he or
she may be less willing to spend money on charitable contributions if he
or she feels poorer or more insecure about his or her economic future.
For example, a taxpayer who sees his or her friends, neighbors or co-
workers losing their jobs may be reluctant to spend money on charitable
contributions, even if he or she has not yet experienced any actual de-
percent of nonprofits have experienced significant economic stress, with more than a third
indicating the stress is ‘severe’ or ‘very severe.’” In Tough Times, Volunteering in America
Remains Strong, CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV. (July 29, 2009), http://www.nationalser-
vice.gov/about/newsroom/releases_detail.asp?tbl_pr_id=1426.
13 John J. Havens, Mary A. O’Herlihy & Paul G. Schervish, Charitable Giving: How
Much, by Whom, to What, and How?, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK
542, 555 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg, eds., 2d ed. 2006).
14 See Yair Jason Listokin, Stabilizing the Economy through the Income Tax Code, 123
TAX NOTES 1575, (2009); see also Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable
Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 383 (1972)
(noting that the deduction is of greater value to those in higher tax brackets).
15 See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329,
339 (2009) (showing that hownership rates are positively correlated with annual income)
16 See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership
is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L. J. 189, 194 (2009) (“Homeowners who may itemize
may deduct interest on mortgage loans, including home equity loans or lines of credit, up to a
certain dollar amount on their first and second homes”). See also Brown, supra note 15, at 342
(“Taxpayers who take the standard deduction on their tax returns reap no benefit from their
mortgage interest payments, even though they have ‘paid’ for them in the purchase price of
their homes”).
17 See Brown, supra note 15, at 341 (“low-income homeowners have virtually all of their
net worth tied up in their homes, while upper-income homeowners have very little net worth
tied up in their homes”).
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cline in income him or herself.  Similarly, even if a taxpayer’s income
has not actually declined, he or she may feel financially insecure, and
therefore reluctant to give to charity, if the value of his or her assets, such
as a home or retirement fund, has declined.
During lean economic times, taxpayers may change not only the
amount that they give, but also the organizations to which they give, as
can be seen by the fact that not all charitable organizations saw a decline
in contributions during the most recent recession.  For example, the ma-
jority of international organizations, environmental and animal-welfare
organizations, health organizations, and human services organizations all
saw an increase in contributions in 2009; these “high-profile” organiza-
tions are generally able to draw contributions from donors by highlight-
ing the increased demand for their services during a recession.18  Among
these organizations, some such as those organizations devoted to animal
welfare and human services, simultaneously experience an increase in
demand for their services that matches, or in some cases exceeds, the
increase in contributions.  For example, 78% of organizations dedicated
to the provision of Human Services reported an increase in demand for
their services in 2010 compared to the previous year.19  Additionally, the
2009 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress stated that “al-
most 62,000 more family members were in shelter at some point during
2009 than had been during 2007, making up almost 40,000 families.”20
Similarly, some animal shelters saw the number of animals taken in rise
18 Id. at 19.  In fact, organizations dedicated to human services or public-society benefit
actually show higher rates of growth during longer recessions. See GIVING DURING RECES-
SIONS, supra note 9, at 7. R
19 November 2010 Fundraising Survey, THE NONPROFIT RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE 13,
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/nrc_survey2010.pdf.  Interestingly,
these organizations constitute a relatively small segment of the nonprofit sector as measured
by donations.  For example, less than one-third of donations from individuals went to organi-
zations that focused on the economically disadvantaged. THE CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND.
UNIV., PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLD CHARITABLE GIVING BY INCOME GROUP—2005 i (2007)
[hereinafter PATTERNS OF CHARITABLE GIVING].  This figure is admittedly both over- and un-
derinclusive, excluding organizations like animal shelters that do not service basic human
needs while potentially including some organizations that do not experience increases in both
supply (of contributions) and demand.  Further empirical research is needed to provide more
detailed information regarding this category.
20 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. OFFICE OF CMTY. PLANNING AND DEV., THE
2009 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT 5 (2010).  The report further notes:
The continued growth in sheltered family homelessness almost certainly reflects the
ongoing effects of the recession.  When compared to 2008, a slightly higher propor-
tion of families came from housed situations, most commonly staying with family.
The fragile economic circumstances of the relatives of struggling parents may mean
that, as soon as job losses begin in an economic downturn, support networks for
families at risk of homelessness fall apart.  Doubled-up housing situations cannot be
sustained, cash is no longer available to help others with rent payments, and families
turn to homeless shelters as the only way of keeping a roof over their heads.
Id.
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by as much as 400% in recessionary years.21  For these organizations, the
increase in donations may be insufficient to keep up with rising
demand.22
While donations to the high-profile organizations described above
increase during an economic downturn, the total amount of donations
decreases, which means that donations to other organizations must de-
cline.  For example, organizations devoted to culture, arts and humanities
generally see a decline in contributions during this time; these low-pro-
file organizations often suffer from an inability to appeal to donors, who
may view the needs of high-profile organizations as more pressing dur-
ing an economic downturn.23  While these organizations do not necessa-
rily experience an increase in demand for their services, the decline in
donations may nonetheless be severe enough to lead to cutbacks, and, in
some cases, a complete shutdown of the organization.24  For example,
the Getty Trust in Los Angeles reduced its 2010 budget by 25%, which
included cuts in staffing, programming, and acquisitions.25  Similarly,
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York closed over one-third of
its twenty-four stores and cut an additional 10% of its employees.26  In
21 Linton Weeks, Hard Times for Snoopy, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 6, 2009), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102238430 (discussing the increase in 2008
from 2007 in an Albuquerque humane society).
22 See GIVING DURING RECESSIONS, supra note 9, at 11 (“Recent growth in giving to R
[human services], while very encouraging, reportedly does not do enough to help social ser-
vice agencies keep up with growing needs for shelter, food support, and other types of assis-
tance sought by people during economic crises.”).
23 See id.  This trend is also consistent with larger historical patterns, which indicate that
contributions to organizations devoted to the arts, culture, and humanities drop more than
contributions to other organizations during economic slowdowns (which are smaller than re-
cessions). See also ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 19. R
24 For example, the Las Vegas Art Museum closed its doors in February 2009. See Ula
Ilnytzky, U.S. Museums Struggle amid Recession, but Attendance is Up, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr.
6, 2009), http://seattletimes.com/html/travel/2008993691_webmuseums06.html.  Some evi-
dence suggests that museums may actually experience some increase in demand during a re-
cession.  The Minnesota Museum of American Art in St. Paul and the Minnesota Center for
Photography in Minneapolis also closed their doors in 2008. See Jason Edward Kaufman,
Troubles Deepen for Museums: Layoffs, Budget Cuts and Cancelled Shows, THE ART NEWSPA-
PER (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Troubles-deepen-for-museums-
layoffs-budget-cuts-and-cancelled-shows/17148; see also Museum Attendance Rises Despite
Recession, CBS NEWS (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-6242891.
html.  According to at least one survey, 57% of museums experienced an increase in attend-
ance in 2009. Id. Although most museums charge a nominal fee for admissions, the increased
attendance was not enough to make up for declines in other sources of funding, as twenty three
museums closed in 2009. Id.
25 Kaufman, supra note 24. R
26 Id. Other examples of museums that have been forced to lay off staff, reduce salaries,
or institute furloughs during the latest recession are the Akron Art Museum; New York’s Asia
Society; the Bishop Museum in Honolulu, Hawaii; the Bowers Museum in Santa Ana, Califor-
nia; the Cleveland Museum of Art;  the Corcoran Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C.; the
Detroit Institute of Arts; the Guggenheim Museum in New York; the Henry Art Gallery at the
University of Washington; the High Museum of Art in Atlanta, the Indianapolis Museum of
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addition to reducing staff, some museums, like the Brooklyn Art Mu-
seum, the Art Institute of Chicago, and the Philadelphia Art Museum
have resorted to selling their artwork in order to generate funds, although
such a move is often met with fierce criticism, protest and, occasionally,
litigation.27  For example, the National Academy Museum and School of
Fine Arts sold two artworks in order to cover its operating costs despite
sharp criticism from the Association of Art Museum Directors.28  The
state of New York even considered legislation that would have prohib-
ited museums from selling pieces from their collections in order to cover
operating costs.29  When Brandeis University considered following suit,
it faced such a public outcry that it was forced to reverse course.30  Ran-
dolph College’s plan to sell four works of art from its collection was
greeted with a court injunction filed by disgruntled alumni, students, and
donors.31
Art; the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston; the Miami Art Museum; the Museum of
Contemporary Art in Denver; the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles; the Museum
of Contemporary Art in San Diego; Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts; the Newseum in Washing-
ton, D.C.; the Pacific Asia Museum in Pasadena, California; the University of Pennsylvania’s
Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology; the Portland Art Museum; the Philadelphia Art
Museum; the Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute in Williamstown, Massachusetts; the
Taubman Museum of Art in Roanoke, Virginia; the Utah Museum of Fine Arts; the Walker
Art Center in Minneapolis; and the Walters Art Museum in Baltimore. See also Timeline:
Museums and the Recession, ARTINFO (June 29, 2009), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/
31099/timeline-museums-and-the-recession/.
27 See id.  See also Kaufman, supra note 24.  Chicago’s Field Museum, the Contempo-
rary Museum, Honolulu, the Denver Art Museum, the St. Louis Art Museum, and the Walters
Art Museum cancelled upcoming exhibitions as a way of reducing costs. See Ilnytzky, supra
note 24.  The Art Institute of Chicago also eliminated raises for upper management and low- R
ered temperatures in its galleries in an attempt to cut costs. Id.
28 Randy Kennedy, National Academy Sells Two Hudson River School Paintings to Bol-
ster its Finances, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/06/arts/design/
06acad.html; see also Robin Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah, the National Academy is Struggling
to Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/arts/design/
23acad.html (noting that the Association of Art Museum Directors urged its members to cease
lending money to the National Academy and forego collaborations after the sale); Robin
Pogrebin, National Academy Revises its Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/03/14/arts/design/14acad.html (describing negotiations between the Na-
tional Academy and the Association of Art Museum Directors).
29 Robin Pogrebin, Bill Seeks to Regulate Museums’ Art Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/arts/design/18rege.html; Robin Pogrebin, Bill to
Halt Certain Sales of Artwork May Be Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.ny-
times.com/2010/08/11/arts/design/11selloff.html?_r=0.
30 See Ilnytzky, supra note 24; Randy Kennedy & Carol Vogel, Outcry over a Plan to R
Sell Museum’s Holdings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/
arts/design/28rose.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1348857735-SGH4QuoaFQD/DDqHeYrHhg
(noting the Massachusetts attorney general’s plan to conduct a detailed review of the planned
sale).
31 See Disputed Randolph College Works to be Sold at Christie’s, ARTINFO (Apr. 18,
2008), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/27390/disputed-randolph-college-works-to-be-sold-
at-christies.
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Organizations devoted to the performing arts have been hit espe-
cially hard, with orchestras in Honolulu, Louisville, New Mexico, Phila-
delphia, and Syracuse all filing for bankruptcy in recent years.32  Other
organizations have managed to stave off bankruptcy, but only by laying
off performers and staff members,33 reducing performances,34 or cutting
salaries and benefits.35  In addition to the fundraising problems faced by
museums, orchestras must also deal with an aging and shrinking audi-
ence that has led to lower ticket sales and particularly steep declines in
donations.36
Trapped in the middle are those organizations that experience both a
decline in donations and an increase in demand for their services.  Do-
mestic violence shelters are prime examples of this type of hidden-need
organization.  Many shelters see both a decline in contributions during a
recession37 and increases in requests for assistance due to abuse stem-
ming from financial issues, stress and job loss.38  As a result, some do-
mestic violence shelters end up reducing their services or closing their
32 Tony Woodcock, American Orchestras: Yes, It’s a Crisis (Part IV), TONY’S BLOG:
FROM THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF NEW ENGLAND CONSERVATORY (May 4, 2011, 4:07
PM), http://necmusic.wordpress.com/2011/05/04/american-orchestras-yes-it%E2%80%99s-a-
crisis/.  Other performing arts organizations that have shuttered their doors in recent years
include Ohio’s The Bang and The Clatter Theatre, the Carousel Dinner Theatre, and Kalliope
Stage.  See Opera Cleveland Slashes Administrative Staff, Launches Restructuring Campaign,
THE PLAIN-DEALER (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com/arts/index.ssf/2010/08/op-
era_cleveland_slashes_admini.html.
33 See, e.g., Steve Bornfield, Recession Forces Cuts by Ballet Company, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL (April 9, 2012), http://www.lvrj.com/news/41078012.html.
34 See, e.g., Daniel Chang, For Florida Opera, Recession Means Fat Lady Won’t Sing,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (May 12, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/05/12/68044/
for-florida-opera-recession-means.html.
35 See, e.g., Bryan Johnson, Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Hit by Recession, FUNCI-
TYFINDER.COM, http://indianapolis-indiana.funcityfinder.com/2009/10/09/indianapolis-sym-
phony-orchestra-recession/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).  Other orchestras that have instituted
pay cuts include the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra, Colorado Symphony Orchestra, and De-
troit Symphony.  Barbara Bell, Small Orchestras Must Beat the Recession to Survive, SUITE
101 (Jan. 21, 2011), http://suite101.com/article/small-orchestras-must-beat-the-recession-to-
survive-a336088.
36 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 35.
37 See TRUTH ABOUT ABUSE, supra note 9, at 3–5 (reporting that three out of four do-
mestic violence shelters reported an increase in women seeking assistance from abuse in 2010,
with 73% of those shelters attributing the rise in abuse to financial issues and 48% to job loss);
see also William Glaberson, The Recession Begins Flooding into the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2009, at A1 (noting that cases involving charges like assault by family members increased
by eighteen percent in New York state in 2009).
38 See Christina Davidson, Recession Increasing Domestic Violence, Decreasing Victim
Options, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2009/12/recession-increasing-domestic-violence-decreasing-victim-options/32205/#
(“While shelters across the country have increased demand for beds, at the same time re-
sources from the government and from corporate donors are down.  Demand is up, support is
down.”); see also TRUTH ABOUT ABUSE, supra note 9, at 6 (reporting that three out of four
shelters indicate their funding has decreased the most from governmental organizations).
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doors entirely.39  Legal assistance organizations provide another example
of hidden-need charities, as the number of Americans eligible for assis-
tance from these organizations increased by 17% from 2008 to 2010,
even as non-federal funding to these organizations remained flat or
declined.40
In light of the fact that an economic downturn appears to have a
significant negative effect on several different types of charitable organi-
zations, the question then becomes what the government can do to miti-
gate those effects.  Currently, the government provides two forms of
support to charitable organizations through tax expenditures; first, by
providing a tax exemption to qualifying charitable organizations, and
second, by subsidizing taxpayer contributions to such organizations
through the charitable deduction.41  This Article focuses on the second of
these benefits, the charitable deduction, and whether modifications to the
deduction can mitigate the various effects that a recession has on charita-
ble organizations in an effective and efficient manner.
II. GUIDELINES FOR FORMULATING A PLAN TO ASSIST CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS DURING A RECESSION
Having determined that an economic downturn has significant and
varied negative effects on charitable organizations, the question then be-
comes whether and how to mitigate those effects.  In particular, any pro-
posed changes to the charitable deduction should be consistent with the
theories that support the deduction in its current form, and, where possi-
ble, address some of the criticisms that have been raised against the de-
39 See, e.g., TRUTH ABOUT ABUSE, supra note 9, at 13–14 (reporting that 47% of shelters
decreased their services due to the economy, with 72% canceling or scaling back services and
63% eliminating staff positions); John Peters, Blue Ridge H.O.P.E. Closing June 30, MT. AIRY
NEWS (June 20, 2012), http://www.mtairynews.com/view/full_story/19042130/article-Blue-
Ridge-H-O-P-E—closing-June-30 (reporting on the closure of the only domestic violence
shelter in Surry County, North Carolina).
40 LEGAL SERVICES CORP., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2010).  The Annual Report also
notes that the number of mortgage foreclosure cases handled by their programs increased by
128%, while unemployment cases increased by 80% and domestic violence cases increased by
9%. Id.  Moreover, the number of cases involving bankruptcy and debt relief matters in-
creased by 24% during this time. Id. at 8.  In addition to the problems brought on by decreased
contributions and increased demand, charitable organizations also face increasing pressure
from governmental regulators.  In particular, Nina J. Crimm has found that state and local
authorities increasingly challenge the tax-exempt status of non-profit organizations during eco-
nomically difficult times, noting that “financially strapped state and local governments have
targeted nonprofits as one means of resolving their pinched monetary and tax base dilemmas.”
Nina J. Crimm, Why All is Not Quiet on the “Home Front” for Charitable Organizations, 29
N.M. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999).
41 See Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J.
1047, 1048 (2009).
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duction.42  Another question that immediately arises is whether such
proposals should focus only on one type of charitable organization (e.g.,
high-profile organizations), or whether such changes should aim to pro-
vide assistance to all types of organizations.  This Part will address each
of these questions in turn.
A. Tax Policy Regarding the Charitable Deduction
When examining the charitable deduction, we must keep in mind
that all tax deductions, including the deduction for charitable contribu-
tions, are tax expenditures, and, therefore, have an impact on the federal
budget.43  In other words, “[T]axpayers that receive benefits from chari-
table relief assign the revenue costs to other taxpayers.  The Treasury
Department needs to tax other taxpayers at a higher effective tax rate to
recoup these revenues.”44  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated
that the deduction in its current form will cost about $230 billion in lost
revenue between 2010 and 2014, assuming current levels of charitable
giving.45
Paul McDaniel argues that, were the deduction to be repealed, the
unsubsidized portion of donors’ contributions would remain unchanged,
even though the total amount received by charitable organizations would
42 Another issue that arises when discussing the treatment of charitable contributions
during an economic downturn is how to determine when an economic downturn has reached a
phase where emergency measures should be implemented.  One possibility is to implement
certain measures automatically whenever the gross domestic product dips below a certain
benchmark or falls below a certain percentage; this is essentially the approach adopted by
Listokin in his proposals to stimulate the American economy.  Yair Listokin, Stabilizing the
Economy through the Income Tax Code, 123 TAX NOTES 1575 (2009).  Alternatively, such
measures could be implemented whenever the gross national product falls for more than two
consecutive quarters, consistent with the conventionally accepted definition of a recession.
See Julius Shiskin, The Changing Business Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1974, at A1.  Although
the need for a definitive benchmark is apparent, determining an appropriate one is beyond the
scope of this Article.
43 See generally Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (1985).  Paul
McDaniel suggests in a subsequent article that discussion of the charitable deduction as an
expenditure is misguided, since the true expenditure is “the nontaxation of the beneficiaries,
again, either directly, or through a surrogate tax on the charitable organization.”  Paul R. Mc-
Daniel, The Charitable Contributions Deduction (Revisited), 59 SMU L. REV. 773, 783
(2006).  In his view, the individual benefits that motivate such contributes, such as altruism or
increases in status or power, constitute “psychic income” that should be deductible unless “the
value of the gift is not likely to be included in income on the donee’s side of the transaction or
administrative concerns justify such an approach.” Id. at 778.
44 Benshalom, supra note 41, at 1073. R
45 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITA-
BLE GIVING: HEARING BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON FIN., 112TH CONG., (2011) [hereinafter OP-
TIONS FOR CHARITABLE GIVING] (statement of Frank J. Sammartino, Assistant Director for Tax
Analysis, Congressional Budget Office) (citing STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010–2014, No.JCS-3-10,
at 45–48 (2010).
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undoubtedly go down.46  In other words, because a taxpayer in the 70%
tax bracket who makes a $100 donation generally does so with the
knowledge that he or she will receive $70 of that $100 back, he or she
will continue to make a $30 contribution in the absence of a deduction.47
According to McDaniel, then, the debate is less about the extent to which
we wish to stimulate taxpayer donations through the deduction as it is
about the extent to which we wish to subsidize those donations with gov-
ernment funds.48
As a result, proponents of the charitable deduction must explain
why assistance to charities should take the form of a tax expenditure
rather than direct government spending, especially since reliance on tax
expenditures
greatly decreases the ability of the Government to main-
tain control over the management of its priorities [and]
run counter to the whole thrust of our concerns with the
ordering of national priorities and with the wise alloca-
tion of our resources, which we have come to see as lim-
ited and therefore in need of careful management.49
Some proponents of the deduction argue that charitable contribu-
tions are fundamentally different from other expenses and should there-
fore not be subject to tax, while others argue that charitable contributions
provide some societal benefits that make them worthy of a deduction.
Still others argue that the charitable deduction provides a mechanism
through which taxpayers can choose which charitable organizations will
receive subsidized support from the government.
These various justifications that have been given for the charitable
deduction can be broadly grouped into three categories: measurement
theory, subsidy theory, and choice theory.
46 McDaniel, supra note 14, at 380. R
47 Id.  It should be noted that McDaniel’s calculations are based on the tax rates at the
time.  However, although the current rates differ slightly, the analysis remains sound.
48 Id. at 381 (“[C]haritable institutions are not concerned solely with maintenance of the
level of out of pocket private giving, but with ensuring that federal funds will continue to be
available at the level provided through the deduction mechanism.”).
49 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 731 (1970).  Sur-
rey points out that tax expenditures present some additional disadvantages when compared
with government spending. Id. at 728.  For example, because tax legislation goes through the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, rather than through
the committee charged with examining the substantive issue involved, tax expenditures are
vetted by legislators with little relevant knowledge regarding the goals and policies underlying
the expenditures. Id.  Furthermore, “[T]he tax incentive program considered by the tax com-
mittees would be isolated from the regular flow of legislation and activity in the field involved,
and this isolation would make coordination and the consideration of priorities difficult.” Id.
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1. Measurement Theory50
According to measurement theorists, any discussion of the charita-
ble deduction should focus not on whether charitable organizations
should be subsidized but instead on whether charitable donors should be
taxed for their contributions.  William Andrews, the leading proponent of
measurement theory, rejects the idea that tax deductions should be used
to implement social policy, arguing instead that they should be used only
when necessary to ensure that the distribution of government funds is
consistent with the distribution of tax burdens.51  Andrews argues that
charitable contributions should be deductible because the goods and ser-
vices they provide do not benefit the donor directly; rather, the direct
benefit goes to others, while the donor receives only nonmaterial satis-
faction.52  He notes that almost all charitable organizations produce col-
lective goods or services that can be enjoyed by many without
diminishment and that, as a result, the value of these goods and services
should not be taxable to either their recipients or their donors.53  Further-
more, he notes that measuring the individual benefits received by donors
would be not only impracticable but also undesirable.54
Measurement theory has been subjected to heavy criticism, most
notably by Mark Gergen and Mark Kelman.55  Gergen argues that An-
50 Thanks to Miranda Perry Fleischer for suggesting the use of this term.
51 Andrews, supra note 6, at 311. R
52 Id. at 314.
53 Id. at 314–15.
54 Id. at 360.  Andrews further argues in support of the deduction by claiming that chari-
table contributions differ from most ordinary gifts, which are generally non-deductible by the
donor, because such gifts tend to occur within a single household. Id. at 349.  Charitable
contributions are also distinct from non-household gifts because of the likely difference in tax
rates between the donor and the likely recipient and because the organization provides a means
of monitoring the redistribution of funds from donor to recipient. Id. at 351.  He also argues
that including taxable contributions as a proxy for taxing benefits would lead to an excessively
high tax rate because charitable contributions disproportionately come from a small number of
high-income donors. Id. at 361.  He notes that donors faced with the prospect of a tax on their
contributions will likely reduce those contributions rather than other expenditures, because a
reduction in contributions will not lead to a reduction in benefits to them. Id. Finally, he
argues that charitable organizations, unlike political organizations, “are numerous enough, and
sufficiently voluntary in their membership relations, so that we need not have the same fear of
oppressive domination by wealthy contributors” as we do in the political arena. Id. at 364.  In
a variation on measurement theory, Boris Bittker argues that corporate charitable contributions
can be viewed as true business expenses because they serve as a form of advertising and that
even individual contributions could be seen as business expenses if they are made at the
prompting of one’s employer and are rewarded with a work-related incentive, such as extra
vacation days.  Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching
Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 57 (1973).
55 See also Benshalom, supra note 41, at 1055 (calling Andrews’ theory “inconsistent
with fundamental tax-policy principles” and arguing that “[i]t neglects the fundamental notion
that income is attributed to the taxpayer that earns it and not to the persons to whom it is
assigned”); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX
L. REV. 679, 689 (1988) (criticizing Andrews’ argument as circular because “[t]he effects of a
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drews’ theory ultimately does little more than “repackage” subsidy the-
ory because, even though Andrews never defines exactly which
collective goods should be excluded from income, he nonetheless argues
that contributions used to provide these goods should be excluded from
income.56  Kelman, on the other hand, questions Andrews’ basic defini-
tion of a charitable donation as a non-preclusive appropriation that does
not divert resources away from the satisfaction of others’ needs.57  In-
stead, Kelman states that “[e]ven when the donor assumes no control
over the donee’s spending, I would argue that his donations are likely to
be appropriative” and that “[i]f the donees, the charitable conduit, or
other members of the donor’s community expend any time or energy
ensuring that the donor enjoys his donation, at least some of the donation
ought to be included in the tax base.”58
Because measurement theory argues that contributions to charitable
organizations should be deductible due to the nature of the goods and
services those organizations provide,59 measurement theorists would be
unlikely to support any changes to the deduction that are based on the
state of the economy rather than any fundamental changes to those goods
and services.  Nonetheless, modifications to the deduction may be sup-
ported by other theories supporting the charitable deduction—like sub-
sidy theory and choice theory—both of which are discussed below.
tax follow from the definition of the base”).  Koppelman also argues that charitable contribu-
tions are not justifiable under measurement theory because “[t]he expenditure of cash or prop-
erty [as a charitable contribution] represents a clear personal benefit to the donor.” Id. at 707.
56 Gergen, supra note 7, at 1416.  In fact, Gergen describes Andrews’ measurement the- R
ory as merely the reverse of the subsidy argument, which sees the deduction as a way “to
encourage people to do voluntarily what we would otherwise have to coerce them to do.” Id.
at 1421.  In particular, Gergen notes that Andrews fails to distinguish between “charitable”
goods that are eligible for a subsidy and other goods that create positive externalities, like
school tuition. Id. at 1424.
57 Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal”
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 838
(1979).
58 Id. at 850.  Kelman is particularly skeptical of the characterization of donations as
nonpreclusive when dealing with high-income donors. Id. at 856 (“[T]he character of gifts
from high-income givers is inevitably reciprocal in a way not necessarily true for the low-
income donor.”).  For example, he notes that gifts by the rich to educational institutions are
often intended to benefit the upper class and “involve a great deal of reciprocity, at least in the
form of attention and deference.” Id. at 858.  Such contributions “seriously undermine[ ] verti-
cal tax equity because large amounts (and percentages) of income are at stake.” Id.  “Thus,”
he notes, “real world complexity undercuts even further an already questionable defense of the
charitable deduction.” Id.  Others have also criticized Andrews’ “ideal income tax” as applied
to the charitable deduction, including McDaniel, who argues that “[t]he notion that a charitable
contribution should be deductible because it creates a common or public good is suspect” and
“finds no support in the Simons definition of income.”  Paul R. McDaniel, The Charitable
Contributions Deduction (Revisited), 59 SMU L. REV. 773, 783 (2006).
59 See Andrews, supra note 6, at 314–15. R
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2. Subsidy Theory
Subsidy theorists generally agree with measurement theorists that
contributions to charitable organizations should be deductible because of
the collective nature of the goods and services provided by those organi-
zations.60  However, unlike measurement theorists who argue that the
public nature of these goods makes it impractical to tax the donors who
fund the organizations that provide these goods, subsidy theorists argue
that taxing those goods will lead to their underfunding.61  Such goods are
commonly referred to as public goods because “one person’s consump-
tion of the good does not reduce its availability to others (i.e., the good is
nonrival or in joint supply); and no one can be excluded from the good
(i.e., the good is nonexclusive).”62  Generally, a good is considered pub-
lic or nonrival if charging individual users for the benefits received
would be more costly and/or burdensome than providing the good for
free.63
Because of their nonexclusive nature, public goods can be provided
to people who do not pay for them; as a result, some people will inevita-
bly refuse to pay, essentially “freeriding” on the payments of others.64
Others will give less than the true cost of the public good, in part because
they may not account for its ancillary benefits.65  The charitable deduc-
tion helps alleviate this problem by spreading the cost of providing pub-
lic goods among all taxpayers, including freeriders.66
Proponents of subsidy theory argue that the charitable deduction
“better matches expense with preference in cases of collective goods for
which demand is universal but heterogeneous.”67  Private charity appears
to be more responsive to differences in demand for collective goods than
the government, in part because it allows smaller groups to act collec-
tively while avoiding the political process.68  Subsidization may be par-
ticularly attractive when the public good is highly desired by a small
minority and only slightly preferred by a large majority, since, without a
60 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 54, at 58–60 (arguing that contributions may be charac- R
terized as either a discharge of a moral obligation or as a reward for praiseworthy behavior;
under either framework, a deduction for contributions would not need to operate efficiently in
order to be considered worthy).
61 See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 7, at 1398 (“Charities that provide goods for which we
cannot or do not wish to charge beneficiaries deserve government support because, without the
subsidy, society will tend to underfund them.”).
62 Id. at 1397.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 1398.
65 See id. Gergen gives as an example a student who fails to take into account the socie-
tal benefits of her education when determining whether to go to college.
66 See id. at 1403.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 1399.
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subsidy, “the minority may not be able to overcome its freerider
problems to provide the appropriate amount of the good.”69
Ilan Benshalom criticizes subsidy theory on the grounds that “there
is no one ‘optimal’ way to supply a set of agreed upon public goods,
and . . . there is no way of determining what goods are indeed undersup-
plied.”70  According to Benshalom, the deduction in its current state
“does not necessarily promote more or better spending on charitable
objectives and [also] creates serious negative externalities,” such as tax
loopholes.71  Furthermore, he decries “the lack of a complete and coher-
ent definition of charitable objectives” among those who espouse subsidy
theory.72
As noted in Part II.C, infra, charitable giving drops during a reces-
sion; because this drop outpaces the decline in the economy as a whole, it
appears that freeriding increases during a recession, since the amount
people are paying for public goods declines without any apparent decline
in the demand for those goods (and, in some instances, an actual increase
in demand, as discussed in Part II.C, infra).73  If the charitable deduction
is intended to address the issue of freeriding, as the subsidy theorists
argue, then an increase in the deduction is warranted when an increase in
freeriding outpaces changes in the economy as a whole.
3. Choice Theory
Those critics, like Benshalom, who find subsidy theory deficient be-
cause it fails to address the process of charitable giving may be more
69 Id.  However, Gergen also notes that this very phenomenon of free riding can be used
to argue against the notion that a deduction is necessary solely because the goods it provides
can benefit society as a whole. Id. at 1411–12.  In his words, “Especially in the case of
churches, schools, and other charities that primarily benefit a small group and secondarily
benefit society generally, attention must be paid to the possibility that the small group has
sufficient incentive to fund the good at an optimal level without a deduction for its payments.”
Id. at 1412.  Moreover, while the charitable deduction alleviates the problem of freeriding, it
arguably harms those who either oppose the programs that receive greater contributions as a
result of the deduction or the “marginally disinterested” who support some level of charitable
funding but do not receive any benefit from the additional donations that occur as a result of
the deduction. Id. at 1412.  In a variation on subsidy theory, Johnny Rex Buckles argues that
the benefits provided by charitable organizations, like many of the benefits provided by gov-
ernment (and even, in some cases, by private actors) constitute types of “community income”
that are not subject to tax because they inure primarily to the general public rather than to
individuals.  Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contribu-
tions Deduction, 80 IND. L. J. 947, 969 (2005).
70 Benshalom, supra note 41, at 1051.
71 Id. at 1076.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Michelle Nichols, U.S. Charitable Giving Approaches $300 billion in 2011,
REUTERS, (June 19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/19/us-usa-charity-idUS-
BRE85I05T20120619; Gross Domestic Product (GPD): Current-dollar and “Real” GDP, BU-
REAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp.
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comfortable with choice theory, which argues that the deduction is bene-
ficial not only because it provides assistance to charities that provide
collective goods, but also because it allows taxpayers to have a voice in
deciding which organizations will be subsidized.74  According to Ben-
shalom, because the typical method of allowing majoritarian preferences
to drive government spending prevents some preferences from being
voiced and addressed, the charitable deduction “should be understood not
only as a method of determining what public goods are undersupplied,
but also as a way to respond to unheard and unaddressed preferences;
this may be referred to as the process-subsidy justification.”75  In his
view, “Charitable relief can correct some of the imperfections associated
with democratic decision making in a way that does not undermine the
centrality of the majority’s decision.”76  In other words, “charitable re-
lief-worthy transactions should promote ‘good things’—meaning a gen-
eral category of public goods—through a process that reveals that some
donors consider these ‘good things’ as socially undersupplied.”77
Similarly, Saul Levmore argues that charitable contributions can be
viewed as a means of voting on which organizations are worthy of finan-
cial support and proposes that the charitable deduction “essentially casts
the government as a financing partner, with taxpayer-donors serving as
intermediaries or agents who choose the providers of, or indeed the very
existence of, certain services.”78  The deduction, unlike direct govern-
ment funding,
may induce citizens not only to choose for themselves
where to apply personal and government funds, but also
to develop a sense of commitment to the chosen chari-
ties.  Thus, they become involved individually as volun-
teers in ways that they would not if their tax money were
simply allocated to the charities by the legislature or by
government bureaucrats.79
74 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 54, at 61 (arguing that the charitable deduction could be R
seen not just as an incentive but as a tool that could be used by taxpayers “to divert funds
which would otherwise be spent as Washington determines and to allocate them to other so-
cially approved functions”).
75 Benshalom, supra note 41, at 1077.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1083.
78 Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 388 (1998). See also Mi-
randa Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault?  Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 165, 229 (2008) (“[C]haritable tax subsidies allow individuals whose preferences differ
from [the median voter] to redirect a portion of funds otherwise flowing to the federal treasury
toward their preferred visions of the public good.”).
79 Levmore, supra note 78, at 406.  Levmore has been criticized for failing to explain
how the charitable deduction, an essentially nondemocratic allocation mechanism, is consistent
with the principles of democratic governance. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 41, at
1062–63.
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As a result, “The charitable deduction scheme permits a kind of
ongoing vote.”80  While some may argue the deduction is unfair to
lower-income taxpayers who receive fewer of its benefits, Levmore
counters that “the government may need all the help it can get in moni-
toring and choosing among hospitals, schools, social welfare agencies,
and the like.”81
Mark Hall and John Colombo propose donative theory, another va-
riation on choice theory, which argues that “only those charitable organi-
zations funded substantially by philanthropic donations deserve and
should be entitled to the tax exemption.”82  While they focus primarily
on the exemption from income tax that is available to many charitable
organizations, the same standard can be, and essentially is, applied in
determining whether an organization is entitled to the subsidy that results
when donors are allowed to deduct donations to a tax-exempt organiza-
tion.  Hall and Colombo believe “the fact that an entity can attract a sub-
stantial level of donations demonstrates its worthiness of and need for
donations—hence, deservedness.”83  Because freeriding prevents the
level of charitable donations from rising to the level needed to optimally
satisfy public needs, charitable organizations need the tax exemption,
and, presumably, the charitable deduction, to fill the funding gap.84  In
sum,
although a majority of voters may resist paying the full
cost of government directly providing certain goods and
services, a majority may be willing for government to
“contribute” to such production because, while they do
not value the particular good or service enough to pay
for all of it, they recognize that they would receive some
marginal benefit from increased production and hence
would be willing to pay for a portion of that increased
production, especially if such agreement would permit a
partial-cross-subsidy of their own special interest.85
Hall and Colombo describe donative theory as “operat[ing] at the
intersection of the failure of both private markets and the government.”86
80 Levmore, supra note 78, at 411.
81 Id. at 406.
82 Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 435–36 (1998) (citing
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52
OHIO ST. L. J. 1379, 1383-84 (1991)).
83 Id. at 436 (citing Hall & Colombo, supra note 82, at 1384-85).
84 See Hall & Colombo, supra note 82, at 1398.
85 MARK A. HALL & JOHN D. COLOMBO, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 107–08
(1995).
86 Hall & Colombo, supra note 82, at 1386.
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In other words, the subsidy is necessary to counteract the apathy of indi-
viduals who are not actively opposed to the activities of charitable orga-
nizations but do not value their services enough to support a direct
government subsidy for those organizations.87
To the extent that the deduction is intended to promote pluralism
among charitable organizations by providing donors a choice in which
organizations receive governmental support, as choice theorists claim,
McDaniel notes that such pluralism is currently confined mostly to that
small percentage of donors who have a high enough income to benefit
from the deduction.88  Given the fact that high-income individuals gener-
ally give to different organizations than low-income individuals, the plu-
ralism argument “has a decidedly elitist cast to it.”89  Alice Gresham
Bullock adds that, not only do high-income individuals tend to support
“high-brow” organizations like public television, orchestras, and muse-
ums, but they are also more likely to patronize the programs offered by
these organizations.90  William J. Turnier goes even further, arguing that
the deduction for charitable contributions is the crass, political result of a
“symbiotic relationship” between those taxpayers who claim the deduc-
tion and the charitable organizations themselves, and that the justifica-
tions given for the deduction are no more than “lofty platitudes . . .
conjured up which serve[ ] as an altruistic fig leaf to cover over the self-
interest of the masses and the politically powerful lobbying forces.”91
Choice theorists argue that the charitable deduction serves not only
as a subsidy to charitable organizations but also as a mechanism for pro-
viding a voice to donors who wish to express a preference regarding
which organizations should receive governmental assistance.92  Whether
the deduction is seen as a means of “voting” or as a means of allowing
taxpayers to demonstrate an organization’s deservedness of a donation,
choice theorists argue that it serves the goal of promoting pluralism
87 See HALL & COLOMBO, supra note 85, at 107–08.
88 McDaniel, supra note 14, at 391. R
89 Id.; see also Surrey, supra note 49, at 725.  Surrey also argues that tax incentives
generally “Keep Tax Rates High by Constricting the Tax Base and Thereby Reducing Reve-
nues.” Id.
90 Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped Poten-
tial of Middle and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 343–44
(1997).
91 William J. Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax Reform: The High Road and the
Low Road, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1703, 1751 (1986).  Similarly, David A. Good and Aaron Wildav-
sky argue the deduction is truly uncontrollable by Congress because “[i]t is not subject to
annual or periodic Congressional review and, within the tax system, there is no limit on how
much a taxpayer can receive.”  David A. Good & Aaron Wildavsky, A Tax by Any Other
Name: The Donor Directed Automatic Percentage Contribution Bonus, a Budget Alternative
for Financing Government Support of Charity, 7 POL’Y SCI. 251, 261 (1976).
92 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 78, at 387–88; Hall & Colombo, supra note 82, at R
1383.
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among organizations.93  However, just as more donors move from the
category of active donors to freeriders during a recession, the number of
taxpayers expressing their choice of particular charitable organizations
through monetary donations also declines during a recession.  If the goal
of the charitable deduction is to promote pluralism among organizations
by providing taxpayers a means for expressing their preferences for
which organizations should be subsidized, then the loss of taxpayers who
are able to express that choice should be an issue of concern for support-
ers of the charitable deduction.
In order to remain consistent with the various theories that support
the charitable deduction, any modifications made to the deduction should
aim to further the goals of those theories.  In particular, any plan to mod-
ify the deduction should try to both reduce freeriding among taxpayers
and promote the ability of donors to express their preferences for particu-
lar organizations through their contributions.
B. Criticisms of the Charitable Deduction
The charitable deduction, like all tax expenditures, provides greater
benefits to those in higher tax brackets, although this effect can be miti-
gated or eliminated by, for example, using a credit rather than a deduc-
tion, or by limiting the deduction to taxpayers below a certain income
bracket.94  In 1977, the top 1.4% of taxpayers received 73.3% of tax
expenditures resulting from the charitable deduction for education,
58.8% of tax expenditures resulting from the charitable deduction for
health, and 43.2% of tax expenditures resulting from the deduction for all
93 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 78, at 388–89; Hall & Colombo, supra note 81, at R
1384–85.
94 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 43, at 103; see also Levmore, supra note 78, at R
405 (“An obvious objection to the use of the charitable deduction as a social choice mecha-
nism to determine government spending is that many citizens effectively are disenfranchised
because they need not file returns or do not benefit from itemizing their deductions.”).  Evelyn
Brody criticizes this feature of the deduction as unfair, since “the opportunity cost of virtue
falls as one moves up the income scale.”  Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to
Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 716 (1999) (quoting RICHARD A. MUS-
GRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 348 (Patricia A.
Mitchell & Frances Koblin eds.) (4th ed. 1984)); see also Benshalom, supra note 40, at 1057
(“Because tax authorities can use means other than deductions to change behavior, deductions
seem to be an inappropriate measure to achieve that end unless there is a special reason to
change the particular behavioral patterns of high-bracket taxpayers.”).  However, Benshalom
does suggest that such a reason may exist, since limiting the deduction to higher tax brackets
may be an efficient way of targeting behavioral changes in taxpayers with more available
income.  He notes that “[s]ome may even claim that this arrangement is equitable if, as a
result, rich people end up saving and consuming less for themselves and investing more in
society.” Id. at 1068.  Ultimately, he concludes that, “Regardless of its consequentialist out-
comes, it is hard to see how the I.R.C. §170 deduction could be incorporated in a society that
venerates the democratic, majority-based decision-making process.” Id. at 1068.
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other charitable contributions.95  As suggested by Surrey and McDaniel,
“Not only are the tax expenditure provisions the primary cause of per-
ceived tax inequity, but it also seems safe to say that they fail to achieve
what most Americans would perceive to be a fair distribution of
funds . . . .”96  As a result, “[T]he deduction appears to provide the great-
est financial incentive to those who have the least financial need for
one.”97  The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the vast majority of
taxpayers who claim the deductions do so in amounts constituting less
than the standard deduction.98  Consequently, “[F]or this overwhelming
majority of taxpayers the incentive is conditioned not on the act of chari-
table giving, but by the taxpayer’s status in life as a home owner, install-
ment purchaser, consumer of durable goods on which local sales taxes
are levied, owner of a car, et cetera.”99
A related argument, raised by Charles T. Clotfelter, among others, is
that even among those who itemize their deductions and can therefore
take advantage of the tax incentive, the amount of benefit they receive is
greater for high-income individuals because of their marginal tax rate.100
In the words of Richard and Peggy Musgrave, “A philosopher-economist
might observe that the opportunity cost of virtue falls as one moves up
the income scale.”101  Because of how progressive marginal tax rates are,
those taxpayers in the highest tax brackets incur the lowest price per
dollar for their charitable contributions, leading to an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources.102
95 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 43, at 71. R
96 Id. at 72.
97 McDaniel, supra note 14, at 383.  In response to those who argue that this “upside- R
down” subsidy is the natural result of our progressive tax structure, Surrey and McDaniel
respond as follows: “Although an individual’s tax burden under a progressive income tax will
rise with income, it does not follow that government assistance should also rise with income;
such a view is contrary to generally accepted notions of the terms on which government assis-
tance should be granted.” SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 43, at 80.  Similarly, they reject R
the argument that elimination of the charitable deduction would have the negative effect of
increasing the “disposable income” of the rich in relation to the poor while reducing charitable
contributions. Id. at 81; see also Surrey, supra note 49, at 720 (deductions “are worth more to
the high income taxpayer than the low income taxpayer; they do not benefit those who are
outside the tax system because their incomes are low, they have losses, or they are exempt
from tax.”). But see Gergen, supra note 7, at 1406 (“Any system in which people save taxes
by giving to charity removes power from the majority and revests it in wealthy donors . . .
[but] the poor perhaps should not complain that a deduction makes giving by the wealthy less
costly if that savings prompts the wealthy to fund charities like the Red Cross or the Salvation
Army which primarily benefit the poor.”)
98 See McDaniel, supra note 14, at 383. R
99 Id.; see also Brody, supra note 94, at 716 (noting that itemizers generally tend to live R
in areas with high state and local income taxes, another factor associated with wealth).
100 CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 103–04. R
101 Id. at 103 (quoting MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 93, at 362). R
102 See id.
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Bittker responds to this criticism of the “upside-down” nature of the
deduction by arguing that it is the natural result of a progressive tax
structure and protests that “you cannot hold up one as the authentic voice
of the people, and condemn the other as a craven surrender to special
privilege.”103  He also notes that the system could preserve the progres-
sivity of the tax structure by increasing either the width of the upper tax
brackets or raising marginal rates, both of which would increase the tax
burden on wealthier taxpayers while simultaneously granting a select
group of them (i.e., charitable donors) some relief from that burden.104
Finally, he argues that, while the deduction’s role in our tax structure
may work against vertical equity, the deduction itself may actually in-
crease progressivity by encouraging wealthier taxpayers to transfer funds
to those in lower tax brackets.105
Like Bittker, John Simon argues that the inequitable effects of the
charitable deduction on different tax brackets are the inevitable results of
a progressive tax system:
Short of revolution or undreamt-of redistributional legis-
lation, affluent individuals will continue to have more
discretionary income and wealth than poor individuals;
they will therefore be better able to afford charitable
gifts; and, accordingly, they will be in a better position
to take advantage of any allowance or matching grant
system . . . .  [T]he present deduction arrangement repre-
sents only an exaggerated version of a more general
power-and-privilege dilemma that will exist so long as
people are allowed to take charitable gifts off their estate
and income taxes . . . .106
Some critics claim that the purpose of the charitable deduction is to
incentivize contributions, and that it achieves that purpose inefficiently
because many of those contributions would be made even if they were
not deductible.107  In other words, they believe that charitable giving is
103 Bittker, supra note 54, at 54; see also John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private R
Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 VA. TAX REV. 229, 244 (1984) (arguing that if philan-
thropy is only price sensitive in the higher income brackets, then concentrating the benefits of
the deduction on those brackets may in fact be more efficient).  Similarly, if we accept Mc-
Daniel’s characterization of the charitable deduction as a mere part of the taxation system
rather than a tax expenditure, then previous criticisms of the deduction as having an “upside-
down” effect on donors or of being inefficient lose their relevance.  McDaniel, supra note 43, R
at 783.
104 Bittker, supra note 54, at 55. R
105 Id. at 55–56.
106 John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty under the Federal Tax System 26–27 (Inst. for
Soc. and Policy Studies Yale Univ., Working Paper No. 5, 1978).
107 See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 14, at 384 (“To the extent there is an incentive effect, R
the deduction is an inefficient means of achieving the desired result”); Surrey, supra note 49,
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inelastic because it does not increase or decrease in response to changes
in cost and, as a result, tax incentives to encourage giving have little
effect.108  Bittker argues that the study most frequently cited in support
of this claim, a doctoral dissertation by Michael K. Taussig, is both
flawed and limited in scope.109  He also explains that subsequent studies
have reached the opposite conclusion by discovering that charitable giv-
ing at both the individual and corporate level is quite elastic.110  Finally,
he argues that “even those who profess faith in Taussig’s conclusions
seem simultaneously to accept the conventional view that the deduction
has a powerful incentive effect” by characterizing the deduction as a
“subsidy” to charitable institutions.111  In his words, “The same dollar of
public money, after all, cannot be both a windfall to donors and a subsidy
to their donees.”112
Gergen criticizes the charitable deduction for providing the same
benefit to all charitable organizations, arguing that this ignores very im-
portant distinctions between those organizations and, in particular, the
motivations behind giving.  According to him, contributions made to
churches may be the result of social pressure (since donations are often
made public to other members), whereas donations made to public televi-
sion are generally made with the expectation that the donor will receive
something of value in the form of desired programming.  In other words,
he finds that subsidized donations are efficient in some situations and
equitable in others.  As a result, he finds the current form of deduction
lacking in its failure to distinguish between the effects that donations to
different organizations have on individual donors.113
Ideally, any changes to the charitable deduction that would be made
during a recession would both comport with the theories underlying the
deduction and address the criticisms that have been made about the de-
duction in its current form.
at 719–20 (charitable deduction is inefficient “because some of the tax benefits go to taxpayers
for activities which they would have performed without the benefits”).
108 See, e.g., Brody, supra note 94, at 715 (“If the policy behind the charitable-contribu- R
tion deduction is to spur donations, then tax subsidies are wasted on donations that would have
been made anyway.”).  Brody notes that even high-income taxpayers may not be increasing
their total contributions so much as shifting the timing of their contributions into those time
periods when tax rates are higher. Id. at 716–717.  As evidence of the limited effect that the
deduction has on giving, she notes that donations actually increased among most income levels
when the charitable contribution deduction for non-itemizers expired, removing for many tax-
payers any tax incentive to make charitable contributions. Id. at 719.
109 Bittker, supra note 54, at 44. R
110 Id. at 52.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Gergen, supra note 7, at 1433–34. R
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C. Should We Focus Our Efforts on Helping Particular Types of
Charitable Organizations?
Because of the varied nature of the effects that an economic down-
turn has on charitable organizations, any measures that are put into place
will invariably have a greater effect on some types of organizations than
others.  The question then becomes whether society should focus its ef-
forts on helping only one type of charitable organization (e.g., high-pro-
file organizations) or instead make an effort to implement measures that
will provide assistance to all types of organizations: high-profile, low-
profile and hidden-need organizations.  In 2009, 1,238,201 organizations
registered with the Service as nonprofit, charitable organizations under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), up from
865,096 in 2001.114  Given this recent proliferation of charitable organi-
zations, policy makers must ask whether all organizations should be enti-
tled to favorable treatment during an economic downturn or whether
measures should be aimed at assisting only particular types of charities.
One possible way to provide relief to at least some charitable orga-
nizations while reducing the burden on government coffers would be to
limit any relief measures to only certain types of organizations, like high-
profile and hidden-need organizations that generally experience in-
creased demand for their services during a recession.  The use of such
measures is not unprecedented.  For example, in 1954 Congress in-
creased the maximum allowable deduction for charitable contributions
from 20% to 30%, but limited the additional 10% deduction to those
contributions made to churches, religious orders, educational institutions,
and hospitals.115  Congress targeted these organizations because they
perceived that these particular institutions were incurring rising costs and
modest returns on endowments.116  Over time, Congress increased the
number of organizations to which the increased deduction applied, even-
tually expanding it to apply to all exempt organizations “that receive a
substantial part of their support from a governmental unit or from the
general public.”117  Later, when Congress limited the maximum deduc-
tion for charitable contributions to 50% of adjusted gross income, it
nonetheless allowed a carryover for contributions made to churches, edu-
114 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: DATA DISCLOSURE AND
IRS’S OVERSIGHT OF ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE IMPROVED 44 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/240/235163.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2009 DATA BOOK 56 (2010), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf.
115 Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review
and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1062–64 (2003) (discussing increases in
maximum allowable deductions for charitable contributions).
116 See id. at 1063.
117 Id. at 1064.
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cational organizations, health-care organizations, and private
foundations.118
Other attempts to modify the treatment of charitable contributions
focus specifically on poverty relief.  For example, Halstead and Lind
propose allowing a higher deduction for contributions to organizations,
like the Salvation Army and soup kitchens, “[W]hich are entirely dedi-
cated to providing direct care to the neediest,” while retaining a lower
deduction for contributions to organizations, like churches, schools, and
arts organizations.  These organizations only indirectly serve the public
interest.119  Additionally, in 1995 Representatives Joseph Knollenberg of
Michigan and James T. Kolbe of Arizona introduced a proposal that
would have provided a credit to taxpayers who donate to organizations
that provide services to individuals with incomes that are near poverty
levels.120  Bullock (who ultimately supports such measures), among
other commentators, criticized such proposals for the administrative
problems they present and argues that such distinctions may create divi-
sions among both the charities and the populations they are trying to
help.121  Similarly, Vada Waters Lindsey argues that such measures
“would lead to a multitude of other special interests lobbying Congress
to enact provisions favorable to their causes as well.”122
Even if modifications to the charitable deduction are not restricted
to contributions made to a particular subset of organizations, the very
nature of the modification may have varying impacts on different chari-
ties.  As noted by Clotfelter, the current tax system already discriminates
among entities.  In particular, high-income taxpayers receive a higher
subsidy than low-income taxpayers due to their higher tax bracket.123
Consequently, the charitable organizations supported by high-income
taxpayers—including cultural institutions—are in essence “favored” by
the current tax system over those charitable organizations favored by
low-income taxpayers—primarily religious organizations.124  Clotfelter
notes that such favoritism may be justified if the former have a greater
118 Id. at 1065.
119 Ted Halstead & Michael Lind, Alter the Tax Code to Avert Elder-Care Crisis, THE
CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.unz.org/Pub/NewAmerica-2001
dec-00028.
120 See CHOICE IN WELFARE TAX CREDIT ACT OF 1995, H.R. 2225, 104th Cong.
§ 23(d)(2).  A similar proposal was made separately by Representative Kolbe in 2001.  Charity
to Eliminate Poverty Tax Credit Act of 2001, H.R. 673, 107th Cong. (2001), http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:H.R.673:-.
121 Bullock, supra note 90, at 358. R
122 Lindsey, supra note 115, at 1089.
123 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 103–04. R
124 See id.
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external benefit to those outside the organization, although he admits that
there is currently no conclusive answer to that question.125
Some argue that the contraction or elimination of these organiza-
tions merely reflects the desires of the general public; after all, museums
tend to focus their time and attention on high-income donors, so if those
donors decide to scale back their support, perhaps these organizations are
simply reaping what they sowed.126  For example, Gergen argues that “it
is ludicrous that sports museums, jazz festivals, and singing groups are
treated as charities.”127  Since such organizations may receive adequate
support in other ways, and because “it is implausible that gifts to these
charities are altruistic in motive,” he proposes removing such organiza-
tions from the realm of tax-exempt organizations, which he argues
should be limited to what he calls “social welfare” organizations.128
Similarly, Charles Borek argues that Congress should “decouple[ ]
the concept of charitable exemptions and deduction from other tax fa-
vored activities” by reserving the term “charitable” for those organiza-
tions whose primary purpose is to benefit the poor.129  In his words, “It is
nonsensical that, for legislative, budgetary, and policy evaluation pur-
poses, private funding for the relief of poverty is lumped together with
fostering amateur sports competition and the prevention of cruelty to ani-
mals, among other things.”130  Narrowing the definition of charitable in
this manner allows both taxpayers and the government to better “assess
the effectiveness of private aid to the poor, and determine when and if
direct subsidies are advisable.”131  According to Lindsey, Congress must
125 See id.
126 See Adrian Ellis, The Recession and US Museums, THE ART NEWSPAPER (Mar. 11,
2009), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/article.asp?id=17087 (“With conspicuous consump-
tion less in favor, speculative fortunes trimmed and priorities adjusted, the social class that art
museums have smooched with most intimately is also the group most likely to sit out the next
few dances.”).
127 Gergen, supra note 7, at 1450 (citing Rev. Rul. 372, 1968-2 C.B. 205; Rev. Rul. 271, R
1965-2 C.B. 161; Rev. Rul. 46, 1966-1 C.B. 133).
128 Id.
129 Charles A. Borek, Decoupling Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 219-20 (2004).  Other scholars focus on the distinction between relig-
ious and secular organizations.  For example, Hochman and Rodgers argue that giving to relig-
ious organizations should be favored because such organizations do not benefit from direct
governmental support. CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 282.  On the other hand, Schaefer argues R
that religious giving should be treated less favorably because religious organizations often use
funds to maintain their own internal structures and support activities aimed at their members.
Id.
130 Borek, supra note 129, at 220. Borek does, however, note that “[o]ther non-charitable
enterprises, such as those principally organized for religious, educational, or health related
purposes, may, and in fact do, assist the poor with economic transfers and services.  It would
be administratively unfeasible to distill the charitable functions from the primary endeavors of
these entities.” Id. at 223.
131 Id. at 222–23.
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focus on organizations aimed at serving the needy in light of the fact that
“[c]haritable giving to organizations benefiting the neediest sector of the
population is relatively modest.”132
Rather than focusing on purpose, Shannon Weeks McCormack pro-
poses providing different levels of funding to charitable organizations
based on whether the organization would be able to sustain itself on un-
subsidized contributions.133  In McCormack’s view, high-profile organi-
zations, like food banks, and hidden-need organizations, like domestic
violence shelters, provide little direct benefit to donors and are therefore
likely to be underfunded.134  Some low-profile organizations, like muse-
ums, orchestras, and ballets, provide significant direct benefits to some
donors in the form of reduced admission fees; McCormack argues that
these organizations are also likely to experience underfunding.135  Other
low-profile organizations, such as churches, schools, parent teacher as-
sociations, recreational sports teams, scouting troops, and neighborhood
beautification projects, provide either direct benefits to donors or direct
benefits to those with whom donors share substantial, ongoing relation-
ships; McCormack argues that donors are motivated to fund these organi-
zations and as a result additional subsidization of contributions to these
groups may be unnecessary.136  Ultimately, McCormack advocates tai-
loring the deduction to more accurately account for the benefits received
by donors.137
Although we could easily limit any proposals aimed at helping char-
ities during a recession to particular organizations, such as those that
focus on poverty relief, doing so would be both ineffective and poten-
tially disastrous for those low-profile and hidden-need organizations that
already experience problems attracting donations.  As noted by Simon,
Dale, and Chisolm, any requirement that charitable organizations serve
the needy
would surely be met with the objection that modern-day
charity and modern-day charitable tax law serve other
important values.  Weighing this objection would take us
back to basics—to the search for a rationale for exemp-
tion or deductibility, or indeed to even more fundamen-
132 Lindsey, supra note 115, at 1086 (finding that only three of the top twenty-five recipi- R
ents of charitable contributions in 1999 were dedicated to poverty relief).
133 Shannon Weeks McCormack, Too Close to Home: Limiting the Organizations Subsi-




136 Id. at 910–11.
137 Id. at 913–14.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\22-3\CJP302.txt unknown Seq: 29  2-MAY-13 9:14
2013] ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 617
tal issues relating to the primacy of redistributional
norms in American law.138
Hall and Colombo add that, “In addition to guarding against subsi-
dization of activities that are unworthy or that simply do not need sup-
port, an ideal concept of charity in the tax exemption arena should guard
against over-subsidizing (or under-subsidizing) those activities that are
deserving.”139  Because donors may already allocate money to those
charities that seem most relevant to an economic crisis, additional at-
tempts to further direct donations to particular types of charities seem
both unnecessary and potentially harmful to those organizations that may
not be as readily able to demonstrate increased need.
Low-profile organizations arguably suffer disproportionately during
an economic downturn, for three reasons.  First, they often rely heavily
on endowments (both their own and outside foundations), which have
suffered drops of as much as 30 to 50%.140  Second, attempts to broaden
their donor base have been largely unsuccessful either because such or-
ganizations lack the technological savvy to reach these donors effectively
or because such appeals are seen as politically undesirable.141  Finally,
because museums in particular face so many fixed costs, any cuts in their
budgets fall disproportionately into the category of operating expenses,
like exhibitions, conservation, research, and curation.142
Moreover, line-drawing, if intended to stimulate giving to charities
that provide basic human services, may ultimately be futile, according to
a study by Michelle H. Yetman and Robert J. Yetman.  They find that
donations to charities that provide basic goods and services to humans in
need appear to be unresponsive to tax incentives, while donations to
charities that appeal to higher human needs, animals, and the environ-
ment are very sensitive to tax incentives.143  In other words, those chari-
ties that many people consider the “worthiest” during an economic crisis
138 John Simon, Harvey Dale, & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charita-
ble Organizations, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 278 (Walter W.
Powell & Richard Steinberg, eds., 2d ed. 2006).
139 Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals:
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 329 (1991).
140 Ellis, supra note 126. R
141 See id. Moreover, Ellis notes that
[o]utside of the restitution of art to Holocaust victims and the occasional censure of
miscreants, museums have for the most part shown limited capacity for effective
collective action.  Industry-wide responses to problems (analogous to those for banks
or the automotive industry) would require an appetite for solidarity that does not
come naturally, even if the industry found a more willing ear in government.
Id.
142 See id.
143 Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, How Does the Incentive Effect of the Chari-
table Deduction Vary across Charities? 3, 23–24 (June 21, 2012) (unpublished working paper)
(on file with the Social Science Research Network).
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are the least likely to receive much benefit from additional tax relief.144
One of the strongest arguments against favoring certain charitable orga-
nizations over others is that those organizations that are commonly per-
ceived as less “needy” during economic downturns are likely to receive
fewer donations even as they continue to need support to maintain their
services.145  Similar criticism has been leveled against the measures im-
plemented after various disasters; for example, Danshera Cords argues
that “donations directed to benefit the victims of a mega disaster may
leave less aid available to victims of less well publicized and smaller
disasters.”146
For these reasons, any proposals made should be viewed in light of
their impact on all three categories of charitable organizations: high-pro-
file, low-profile, and hidden-need.
Having reviewed the effects of an economic downturn on charitable
organizations, the theories underlying the charitable deduction, the criti-
cisms surrounding the deduction, and the reasons for tailoring measures
that will assist all charitable organizations during an economic downturn,
the next step becomes determining what form those measures should
take.  Part III, infra, reviews changes to the deduction that have been
previously proposed and examines which of these proposals would best
achieve the goals of the charitable deduction during recessionary times.
The final question is whether such measures acting alone are sufficient,
or whether additional government intervention is necessary.
III. PROPOSALS
Proposals aimed at individual donors should have the greatest im-
pact on charitable giving, since individuals gave over $227.41 billion in
2010, representing about 73% of all contributions.147  As a result, this
Article focuses primarily on proposals aimed at stimulating charitable
giving among individual donors; some of these measures may also be
applied to organizational donors.  While some of these measures, like
lifting the cap on the current deduction for contributions, allowing volun-
teers to deduct the value of volunteering, and increasing the rate of the
144 Clotfelter also found differences in elasticity among various nonprofit organizations,
noting that donations to religious non-profit organizations are somewhat less elastic than dona-
tions to secular ones, although he concluded that “the evidence regarding the price elasticity
does not, on the whole, support the notion that religious giving is less price-sensitive than
giving for other purposes.” CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 64–66.  Although Clotfelter’s study R
does not look specifically at charitable giving during a recession, it does suggest that charitable
giving to secular non-profits, at least, might increase if the cost of such giving were to decrease
due to changes in the charitable deduction. See id. at 10–13.
145 See Weeks, supra note 21.
146 Danshera Cords, Charitable Contributions for Disaster Relief: Rationalizing Tax Con-
sequences and Victim Benefits, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 439 (2008).
147 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 11. R
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deduction, may have some impact on levels of charitable giving, I argue
that the most effective ways to stimulate giving by individual donors
during a recession are to convert the current deduction to a tax credit that
is available to all donors and to provide a tax credit to employers who
pay for their employees to work for charitable organizations.148  Ulti-
mately, however, because such stimulus is insufficient to provide relief
to some types of charitable organizations, particularly low-profile and
hidden-need organizations, I argue that such measures should be supple-
mented by direct government spending targeted at assisting those organi-
zations during a recession.
A. Proposals Aimed at Individual Donors
1. Lift Cap on Charitable Deduction
One administratively simple way to stimulate charitable giving
would be to raise the cap on deductibility for charitable contributions,
currently set at fifty percent.149  One proponent of lifting the cap, Bittker,
argues that “[f]or those who fear that we will be unable to carry on as a
nation if everyone adopts the practice of giving all of his income to char-
ities, I suggest there are greater dangers on the fiscal horizon to which
they could turn their attention with profit.”150
While lifting the cap on deductions may seem to be a fairly straight-
forward way to increase donations, particularly during an economic
148 Some measures, while initially promising, are clearly non-starters.  For example, in
2001, Representative Watts proposed allowing individuals over age fifty-five to make penalty-
free withdrawals from their retirement accounts in order to make charitable contributions.
Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001), http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/F?c107:2:./temp/~c107TLzSkl:e5680:.  The drawbacks of such a measure are
clear; not only would it incentivize people to spend money intended for their retirement, it
would, if implemented during an economic recession, encourage people to remove money
from their accounts at a time when those accounts are likely to be at their lowest values.
Another possibility may be to encourage non-cash contributions.  In 2007, 23.8 million indi-
viduals reported $58.7 billion in deductions for their non-cash contributions.  Pearson Liddell
& Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2007, STAT. OF INCOME BULL.: SPRING
2010, 52, 52–53 (2010).  Corporate stock donations accounted for almost half of these contri-
butions, followed by donations of clothing and land. See id.  While adjustments to the treat-
ment of non-cash contributions may be desirable, the focus of our inquiry should nonetheless
be on the tax treatment of cash donations, since they constitute the bulk of all charitable contri-
butions. See generally id.  In 2011, the CBO reviewed eleven potential adjustments to the
current deduction, which they grouped into the following four categories: 1) adding a floor to
the current deduction, 2) extending the deduction to include all taxpayers, 3) replacing the
deduction with a 25% credit, and 4) replacing the deduction with a 15% credit. OPTIONS FOR
CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 44, at vii.
149 I.R.C. § 170 (2010).  The Obama administration is unlikely to support lifting the cap
on the charitable deduction, since it recently proposed legislation that would extend the reach
of the current cap. See Suzanne Perry, Obama’s Plan to Reduce Charitable Deductions for the
Wealthy Draws Criticism, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 26, 2009, at 1, http://phi-
lanthropy.com/article/Obamas-Plan-to-Reduce/63024/.
150 Bittker, supra note 54, at 62. R
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downturn, the measure does have its critics.  Patrick Tolan, in his critique
of the lifting of the cap as part of the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act
of 2005, notes that the measure “violates vertical equity, because only
those with donations above the suspended limits would benefit.”151  As
he notes, “Those likely to benefit the most would have to have sufficient
wealth to be able to subsist on less than fifty percent of their AGI.”152
Fleischer argues that the charitable deduction represents a “bargain”
between two groups of donors, the “classic majority and the new major-
ity,” in which “[t]he classic majority will fund the new majority’s minor-
ity-preferred projects only to the extent the new majority agrees to fund
the classic majority’s preferred projects, and vice versa.”153  Given this
system, “Limiting an individual’s charitable deduction to half of her in-
come implements this bargain by ensuring that the amount of govern-
mental subsidy to her preferred minority projects will not exceed the
amount of taxes she pays to fund the classic majority’s projects.”154
Under Fleischer’s theory, lifting the cap could disrupt this delicate bal-
ance and lead to disproportionate levels of support going to preferred
minority projects.
The greatest advantage, or disadvantage, of lifting the cap on the
charitable deduction lies in the fact that it would have the largest effect
on wealthy donors.  Supporters of lifting the cap may argue that such a
measure would stimulate giving by those donors who tend to give the
most to charity.  After all, while the median contribution among all
households was less than $3000 in 2011, households with more than
$200,000 annual income made a median contribution of over $14,000,
more than five times the median amount across all income levels.155
Moreover, targeting high-income donors by lifting the cap may be desir-
able from a distributional justice perspective, since “an appealing aspect
of encouraging charity from the wealthy is that it induces them to in-
crease their support of public goals.”156  In other words, donations by
wealthy individuals essentially act as a form of voluntary redistribution
151 Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., The Flurry of Tax Law Changes Following the 2005 Hurricanes:
A Strategy for More Predictable and Equitable Tax Treatment of Victims, 72 BROOK. L. REV.
799, 838 (2007).
152 Id.
153 Fleischer, supra note 78, at 229. R
154 Id.
155 How America Gives, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, http://philanthropy.com/arti-
cle/Interactive-How-America-Gives/133709 (click “Contributions by household” then “Giving
by income levels”; view “All Income Levels” and “$200,000 and above”) (last visited March
25, 2013).
156 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and
the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 234 (2009).
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that places the burdens of giving on those who are best able to bear
them.157
Critics of lifting the cap argue that focusing on the wealthy is unfair
because it leads the wealthy to disproportionately receive the benefits of
the subsidy (i.e., the pleasure of making a donation).158  However, David
Schizer counters that this does not in fact raise any such problems, since
wealthy donors essentially “pay for” this benefit as a result of the pro-
gressive tax rate schedule.159  David A. Good and Aaron Wildavsky, on
the other hand, argue that any measure that disproportionately benefits
wealthy donors erodes legitimacy in the tax system; they argue that, “By
allowing some individuals to substantially decrease their tax bills by
means of charitable contributions, public confidence in the fairness of the
tax system is diminished.”160
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against lifting the cap is that
it may not have much effect and would be nothing more than a superfi-
cial remedy aimed at those who are simply looking for a feel-good way
to argue that they are taking some action to help charitable organizations
without actually doing anything.  As Nancy Knauer notes,
The most widely-touted tax incentive [of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981] was the increase in the ceil-
ing limitation on the corporate charitable contribution
deduction from five percent to ten percent of the corpo-
rate taxpayer’s “contribution base.” . . .  In the end, the
increase represented a case of wishful thinking because
virtually no [corporate donor] sustained contributions
that even approached the old five percent limit.161
Among all individuals who claimed a charitable contribution on
their tax return, the average contribution was only $4,708 in 2007, far
below 50% of adjusted gross income for most taxpayers.162  Even tax-
payers with incomes greater than $200,000 contributed an average of
 $14,088 in 2011.163
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 Id. at 235.
160 Good & Wildavsky, supra note 91, at 261. R
161 Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of Institutional Choice and
Government Created Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945, 961–62 (1997).
162 Grant Williams, Charitable Deductions Rose in 2007, IRS Report Says, THE CHRONI-
CLE OF PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 4, 2010.
163 How America Gives, supra note 155.  Currently, the Obama administration has pro-
posed reducing the rate at which individual donors may deduct their charitable contributions
from 35%; such a proposal is estimated to decrease charitable giving by more than $7 billion a
year.  Martin Feldstein, A Deduction from Charity, WASHINGTON POST, March 25, 2009.
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In addition to providing a greater tax benefit to wealthier donors
while providing little if any tax benefit to lower-income donors, raising
the cap would likely provide the greatest relief to the low-profile organi-
zations that are favored by these donors, like museums and other arts
organizations.  While that effect may be mitigated somewhat if high-in-
come donors turn their attention to high-profile organizations, like home-
less shelters, during an economic downturn, hidden-need organizations
are likely to be left in the lurch.  Ultimately, while lifting the current 50%
cap may be an administratively simple measure to implement, the mea-
sure presents little upside in terms of increased aid to charitable
organizations.
2. Increase Rate of Deduction
Another way to stimulate charitable giving by individuals during an
economic crisis is to increase the value of the deduction by increasing the
rate at which a contribution may be deducted.164  Currently, this rate is
tied to the donor’s marginal tax rate, so the deduction would have to be
decoupled from the income tax rate, perhaps through the use of uniform
tax credits that are tied, for example, to the business cycle.165  Listokin
observes that such manipulation of tax subsidies in response to an eco-
nomic downturn is hardly novel, since Congress frequently makes such
adjustments during recessions.166
Paul McDaniel’s proposal of matching grants achieves similar re-
sults by tailoring each donor’s deduction to the relative value of the con-
tribution to that individual.  Under this system, “Each donor’s gift would
be matched by a predetermined amount from the government, the federal
share to be transmitted directly to the charitable institution of the donor’s
choice.”167  However, the amount of the match would be based on the
percentage of the donor’s income represented by the grant because, in
McDaniel’s words,
[I]f there is to be a reward for charitable giving, the inci-
dence and amount of the reward should bear some ra-
tional relationship to the act of charitable giving.  The
reward should be the same for persons who make a simi-
lar sacrifice, however measured.  This appears to call for
a system which increases the reward as the individual
sacrifices a greater proportion of his income to
charity.168
164 See Listokin, supra note 14, at 3–4. R
165 See id. at 7.
166 Id. at 8.
167 McDaniel, supra note 14, at 378. R
168 Id. at 394.
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Bittker, however, argues that “[a] system of matching grants would
be a poor substitute for the deduction, but the proposal independently
faces such serious constitutional and political obstacles that it can in any
event be regarded as a dead end.”169
While the data is inconclusive, an increase in the rate of deduction
is likely to have the largest impact on wealthier taxpayers (and, under the
current system, would have no impact on taxpayers who do not item-
ize).170  As a result, such a measure would probably provide the greatest
assistance to low-profile organizations, which tend to be favored by
wealthier taxpayers.  High-profile organizations may also benefit from
the enhanced attention they receive during an economic downturn, but
the measure is unlikely to have much effect on hidden-need organiza-
tions.  Overall, during a recession, many middle-income taxpayers will
be unable to make charitable contributions even with the added incentive
that comes from an increased deduction, especially if they are part of the
many taxpayers who lose their jobs during an economic downturn.  As a
result, while an increase in the rate of deduction appears to have its bene-
fits, such an increase standing alone is unlikely to have a large impact on
levels of charitable giving.
3. Extend Deduction to Non-Itemizers
Currently, only taxpayers who itemize their deductions may take
advantage of the charitable deduction; since about seven out of ten tax-
payers take the standard deduction, the vast majority of taxpayers have
no monetary incentive to contribute to tax-exempt organizations.  Non-
itemizing taxpayers have been allowed to deduct their charitable contri-
butions in the past, most recently between the years 1982 and 1986.171
Since that time, various scholars have advocated extending the deduction
to non-itemizers again.172
Despite supporters of the provision, Congress nonetheless elimi-
nated it, allowing non-itemizers to deduct their charitable contributions
in 1985, in part because they viewed it as a “double deduction” that cre-
ated administrative burdens for both the Service and for taxpayers who
could otherwise avoid filing a return.173  Congress further noted that
“[w]hile the proposal to repeal the non[-]itemizer deduction may have
169 Bittker, supra note 54, at 56. R
170 See McDaniel, supra note 14, at 383. R
171 See Lindsey, supra note 115, at 1068 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-215, at 201–02 R
(1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 285, 291–92 (reporting on Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981)).
172 See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Mar-
ket for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 611 (2009).
173 See Ronald A. Pearlman, Repeal of the Charitable Contribution for Nonitemizers Ex-
plained, 28 TAX NOTES 1140, 1140 (1985).
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some adverse effect on the amount of charitable giving, we believe that
contributions by non[-]itemizers, who generally have relatively low mar-
ginal rates, are not affected significantly by tax considerations.”174  Since
then, various attempts have been made to introduce legislation that
would once again allow such taxpayers to deduct at least some portion of
their charitable contributions, although none of these attempts have been
successful.175  For example, one bill proposed allowing the deduction
only for those contributions that exceed one percent of the taxpayer’s
income, based on the rationale that “using a fixed percentage of income
as the threshold for the deduction would ensure a uniform incentive to
contribute, regardless of income.”176
By extending the base of taxpayers receiving a tax incentive to con-
tribute to charitable organizations, the proposal furthers the goals of the
charitable deduction by reducing freeriding and expanding the number of
donors who are given an incentive to express their support of those orga-
nizations.  Making the tax benefits associated with charitable giving
available to all taxpayers during a recession has the added advantage of
potentially providing additional tax relief to low-income taxpayers for
contributions they may have been inclined to make anyway.  The mea-
sure would most likely have the greatest impact on high-profile organiza-
tions, which would benefit from greater contributions made by the
middle- and low-income taxpayers who tend to favor those organiza-
tions.  However, a more effective measure may be to not only expand the
donor base but also provide additional incentives to give through a tax
credit.
4. Switch from Deduction to Credit
Several scholars have proposed not just increasing the rate of deduc-
tion but also changing the deduction to a credit.  In essence, a full tax
credit for the amount of a contribution is the equivalent of a deduction at
a 100% rate.  Converting the deduction to a uniform credit that would be
divorced from marginal tax rates could address the previous criticism of
the charitable deduction, namely that it is of greater value to those in
higher tax brackets.177  Moreover, at least some studies have shown that
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., The Savings Opportunity and Charitable Giving Act of 2001, S. 592, 107th
Cong. (2001); CARE Act of 2005, S. 1780, 109th Cong. (2005); Tax Relief Act of 2005, S.
2020, 109th Cong. (2005).  Lindsey, supra note 114, at 1092 (internal citations omitted).
176 Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incen-
tives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 52 n.121 (2006) (citing
President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform).
177 See generally Batchelder et al., supra note 176 (arguing for a uniform refundable tax
credit).  Another alternative, proposed by the Filer Commission, would be to allow donors at
certain income levels to deduct some multiple of the amount of their contribution. See GIVING
IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 30. R
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donors are more responsive to a credit than they are to a deduction or
matching donation.178
Recently, Saul Levmore proposed “a partial credit, or a partial credit
up to some ceiling . . . [combined with] a greater credit or deduction for
filers whose charitable contributions exceed a specified percentage of
their income.”179  However, he notes that such a system runs the risk of
organizations competing too vigorously for a donor’s funds, “[G]reatly
reduc[ing] the likelihood of either extracting information about respon-
dents’ true preferences or encouraging individual involvement in (or
monitoring of) charitable works.”180  Viewing donors as “voters” and
contributions as “votes,” he argues that “voters might take their votes
more seriously when required to pay for them,” which does not happen
when the donor receives a full credit for the amount of their donation.181
One of the most appealing features of a tax credit for charitable
contributions is that a credit could be made available to all taxpayers.  A
tax credit that can be utilized by all taxpayers is likely to increase contri-
butions to the high-profile organizations favored by low-income taxpay-
ers, like organizations dedicated to poverty relief, while reducing
contributions to the low-profile organizations favored by the wealthy,
like educational institutions, hospitals and arts organizations.182  This ef-
fect may be exacerbated by the fact that organizations like schools and
hospitals are more sensitive to changes in the cost of giving than relig-
ious organizations.183  For example, in one study, Martin Feldstein esti-
mated that replacing the charitable deduction with a 30% tax credit
would increase total giving by 15%, but would reduce contributions to
schools and hospitals by about 20%.184  In a subsequent study, Feldstein
and Amy Taylor found that a 25% tax credit would leave total giving
relatively unchanged, but would increase giving to religious organiza-
178 See, e.g., Kimberley Ann Scharf & Sarah L. Smith, Rational Inattention to Subsidies
for Charitable Contributions (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP7760,
2010).  The CBO estimates that a 25% credit would increase charitable contributions by $2.7
billion, while costing the Government about $7.1 billion in foregone revenue. OPTIONS FOR
CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 44, at 18.
179 Levmore, supra note 78, at 416. R
180 Id. at 410–11.
181 Id. at 411.
182 See Good & Wildavsky, supra note 91, at 264. See also Daniel Halperin, A Charita- R
ble Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-in Gains, 56 TAX L.
REV. 1, 9–10 (2002) (noting that a credit would likely increase support to religious organiza-
tions and arguing that “it may not make sense to support a credit, which would be disruptive
and controversial, unless one also asserts that this shift in priorities is desirable.”).
183 See Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II—The
Impact on Religious, Educational, and Other Organizations, 28 NAT’L TAX J. 209, 224 (1975).
184 Id.
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tions by almost 10% and would reduce giving to educational institutions
by 24%.185
Some scholars have expressed concerns about converting the cur-
rent tax deduction for charitable contributions to a credit.  For example,
McNulty notes that, while a tax credit “appears to be the most neutral or
fair allowance if the allowance’s purpose is . . . to subsidize or reward
socially desirable behavior . . . a deduction would better serve to define
income and cannot definitively be viewed as less efficient than a credit
nor more inappropriate as an incentive or subsidy.”186  Bruce Chapman
goes further, arguing that a deduction is preferable to a credit because it
not only encourages diversity, an advantage that the
charitable sector has over politics—which can only
avoid political instability by offering bland consensus-
building policies—but also comes closest to charging
high[-]income, high demanders the price for public
goods that is closest to that which is required of them to
achieve a community wide consensus.  A tax credit fails
sufficiently to take into account the higher share of the
taxes that high demanders must pay to the general tax
revenue to make up for the tax subsidy given to charita-
ble contributions.  The tax deduction offsets this higher
share by the same marginal tax rate that generates the
higher tax share in the first place and, therefore, is more
tax neutral and more politically stabilizing.187
Although attempts to permanently institute a tax credit for charita-
ble contributions have been met with resistance, a temporary credit that
is only in place during an economic downturn may be more politically
palatable and therefore easier to implement.  In addition, a credit would
go furthest towards advancing the goals of the charitable deduction, since
it would give equal voice to all taxpayers, including those who may feel
the most neglected during a recession because their incomes are too low
to take advantage of the current itemized deduction for charitable contri-
butions.  Finally, a credit temporarily introduced during an economic
downturn would almost certainly provide the greatest benefit to high-
profile organizations, which would likely draw in the largest portion of
new donations, although the impact it would have on low-profile and
hidden-need organizations remains unclear.
185 Martin Feldstein & Amy Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44
ECONOMETRICA 1201, 1219 (1976).
186 McNulty, supra note 103, at 247. R
187 Bruce Chapman, Between Markets & Politics: A Social Choice Theoretic Apprecia-
tion of the Charitable Sector, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 821, 866–67 (1998).
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5. Allow Donors to Deduct Volunteer Services
Another way of encouraging individuals to provide assistance to
charitable organizations is by allowing them to deduct time spent volun-
teering at such organizations.  Currently, taxpayers are not allowed to
deduct the value of volunteer services they provide to charitable organi-
zations, although they may deduct some of the expenses they incur as a
result of volunteering.188  Although the donation of time is not deducti-
ble, while the donation of money or goods is, the effect on those taxpay-
ers who itemize their deductions (and therefore are allowed to deduct
their tangible donations) is essentially the same regardless of the form
their donation takes.189  For those taxpayers who do not itemize their
donations, and therefore would not be able to deduct donations of goods
or services, volunteering is more advantageous from a financial
standpoint.190
The number of Americans who formally volunteered with charitable
organizations rose by about one million in 2008 over the previous year,
to 61.8 million, or about 26.4% of the adult population.191  These volun-
teers contributed about eight billion hours of service, which had an esti-
mated value of $162 billion.192  Charitable organizations also forecast
increasing numbers of volunteers in the coming years.193  Additionally,
in contrast to declining charitable donations, between 2007 and 2008, the
rate of volunteering actually increased slightly, from 26.2% to 26.4%
during this time.194  An explanation for this increase could be the rise in
unemployment, which has allowed many people who were previously
working to spend more time volunteering.195
Some scholars have suggested encouraging volunteering even fur-
ther through tax incentives.  For example, Alice M. Thomas proposes “a
charitable volunteerism deduction (or tax credit) [that] would be availa-
ble to people who volunteer at least thirty-five hours in a taxable year,
engaged in meeting the needs of marginalized individuals and/ or com-
munities.”196  She supports the deduction as part of a “profoundly Amer-
ican” tradition and argues that “[a] civil society requires its citizens to
188 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (2012).
189 See McNulty, supra note 103, at 241. R
190 See id. at 241 n.52.
191 CORPORATION FOR NAT’L & CMTY SERV., VOLUNTEERING IN AMERICA RESEARCH






196 Alice M. Thomas, Re-Envisioning the Charitable Deduction to Legislate Compassion
and Civility: Reclaiming Our Collective and Individual Humanity Through Sustained
Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 269, 332 (2010).
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engage and connect with one another.”197  Additionally, she notes that
people who volunteer tend to be “happier, have positive self-esteem, and
are less depressed and less anxious.”198  Finally, Thomas suggests that a
deduction for volunteer time would counteract the currently biased sys-
tem, in which organizations that provide charitable services receive pref-
erential tax treatment, while individuals who do so do not.199
The effect of any attempts to encourage volunteering through tax
expenditures depends in part on how taxpayers view volunteering, i.e.,
whether they see it as “simply a competing use of time, such as leisure,
work, and household production, or whether it is a form of investment in
human capital.”200  If the former view is favored, then tax incentives for
volunteering are likely to have little effect, since volunteers are making
their decisions wholly independently from tax considerations.  However,
if the latter view is favored, then a tax deduction may cause taxpayers to
see volunteering as a more “profitable” investment in human capital than
other, similar investments of time.
Similarly, the effect of a tax deduction also depends on whether
taxpayers view gifts of money and gifts of time as complements or as
mere substitutes.  If the former is true, then a tax deduction for volunteer-
ing would once again have little effect, since volunteers would neither
increase their volunteering nor reduce their monetary contributions in re-
sponse to the deduction.  On the other hand, if donations of time are seen
as a substitute for donations of money, then the former may increase in
response to a tax deduction, at least among those taxpayers who would
be eligible for the deduction.  Thus far, little research has been done into
these questions, so the true impact of a tax deduction for volunteering
remains unclear.201
One advantage to encouraging volunteering through a tax deduction
is that it may increase monetary donations as well.  The Office of Re-
search and Policy and the Corporation for National and Community Ser-
vice note that “[v]olunteers were much more likely than non-volunteers
to donate to a charitable cause in 2008, with 78.2% contributing $25 or
more compared to 38.5% of non-volunteers.”202  While such a result may
seem surprising, especially if so many volunteers are donating their time
because they are unemployed, the generosity of volunteers may stem
197 Id. at 303.  For example, Thomas notes that “[p]romoting a spirit of civic participation
and service has been a longstanding policy of the federal government that came together in a
formal program most recently in the early 1990’s.” Id. at 307.
198 Id. at 304.
199 Id. at 320–21.
200 CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 275. R
201 See id. (finding that, among women, “contributions and volunteering are comple-
ments, implying that the charitable deduction encourages volunteering as well as donations”).
202 VOLUNTEERING IN AMERICA, supra note 192, at 1. R
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from their desire to aid an organization once they become personally
involved in its success.
Critics argue that allowing a deduction of time would create inequi-
ties between those who give time and those who, unable to give time,
give money instead.  In order to understand this argument, we must un-
derstand the relationship between monetary contributions and volunteer
services.  One argument made in favor of the charitable deduction is that
individuals who contribute the money they earn through time spent on
for-profit activities should not pay higher taxes than similarly situated
individuals who directly contribute their time to charitable organiza-
tions.203  The deduction is justified under this view because it “equalizes
both the relative incentives to contribute services, cash or property and
the tax treatment of taxpayers who similarly surrender economic re-
sources only in different forms.”204  In other words, the deduction is not
so much an incentive as the removal of a disincentive to contribute cash
or property that neutralizes the choice between giving money on the one
hand or services on the other.205
However, donations of money and time may not be as equivalent as
they initially seem.  Gergen notes that volunteer services are typically
estimated to be worth only about one-fifth to two-fifths the value of cash
contributions, which suggests that the two types of contributions are not
comparable.206  Similarly, Clotfelter observes that the argument that vol-
unteers and monetary contributors become equal under the current sys-
tem of deduction holds true only if we consider itemizing taxpayers; for
non-itemizers, volunteering is more cost-effective than contributing
money or goods.207
There may also be hidden financial costs associated with volunteer-
ing as well.  For example, Jerald Schiff notes that “attracting and utiliz-
ing volunteers is costly to a charity.”208  An organization must expend
valuable resources to solicit, train, and supervise volunteers, resources
203 See McNulty, supra note 103, at 241 n.52 (comparing a doctor who volunteers his R
time to an attorney who volunteers the money he earned by spending the same amount of time
on paid work).
204 Id. at 241.
205 See id.
206 Gergen, supra note 7, at 1420; see also Kristin Choo, Pro Bono: Pay Cut for Public R
Service: These Associates See Great Gain in the Trade-Off, 95 A.B.A. J. 27 (June 2009).
207 CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 152. R
208 JERALD SCHIFF, CHARITABLE GIVING AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 59–60 (1990).  For
example, Jean Baldwin Grossman and Kathryn Furano note that “benefits are not automati-
cally bestowed when volunteers show up.  No matter how well-intentioned volunteers are,
unless there is an infrastructure in place to support and direct their efforts, they will remain at
best ineffective or, worse, become disenchanted and withdraw, potentially damaging recipients
of services in the process.”  Jean Baldwin Grossman & Kathryn Furano, Making the Most of
Volunteers, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBL., Autumn 1999, at 199, 217. They further note that
mentoring programs, for example, cost about $300 per year per volunteer. Id.
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that may be put to more effective use elsewhere.209  As a result, “Organi-
zations may, and often do, turn down volunteer labor, since it is unpaid,
but not free.”210
As an alternative to allowing taxpayers to deduct time spent volun-
teering with charitable organizations, Nancy Staudt proposes giving a
“charitable service credit” to individuals who donate their services to
charitable organizations.211  Staudt acknowledges that such a program
would pose administrative problems, in part because of the indeterminate
value of labor.212  She also recognizes the philosophical dilemma
presented by rewarding individuals for fulfilling their social responsibili-
ties, as well as the potential for corruption and budget overruns that
would accompany what essentially amounts to publicly funded employ-
ment.213  Nonetheless, she argues that a charitable service credit would
be beneficial because it would “work as an incentive for individuals to
participate in social and political institutions and at the same time give
public recognition to their labor as socially valuable.”214  If implemented
as a small, “almost symbolic,” payment for service, the credit would in-
crease community involvement and provide the poor with a way to fulfill
their social obligations without creating an undue burden on federal
revenues.215
The primary benefit of allowing a deduction for volunteer service is
that it would provide financial relief to the underemployed while also
providing assistance to charitable organizations.  Ultimately, however,
such a deduction may prove to be unworkable, even as a temporary mea-
sure during a recession, due to the necessary changes that would have to
be made to both the Code and the way we conceive of the charitable
deduction.  A more viable proposal, discussed in the following section,
209 See SCHIFF, supra note 208, at 60. R
210 Id.





215 Id. Another alternative to allowing a deduction for individual volunteer service would
be to pay individuals that donate their time to non-profit organizations a salary through a
government agency.  The Clinton Administration created the Corporation for National and
Community Service, a charitable government corporation, as a partnership between the gov-
ernment and non-profit sectors to work closely with state and local authorities.  Knauer, supra
note 161, at 969.  The Corporation, whose purpose is to allow young people to serve their R
communities while also earning money for education, manages three volunteer programs:
AmeriCorps, Learn and Serve, and the National Senior Service Corps. Id. at 970.  Given the
relatively young age of this corporation, its effectiveness is not yet known, although it does
provide one example of an innovative way to encourage charitable contributions of time rather
than money.
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may be to provide a tax credit to employers who second their employees
to work for charitable organizations.
6. Provide a Tax Credit to Employers for Seconding
As an alternative to providing a tax incentive to individuals who
volunteer their services to charitable organizations, the government could
provide an incentive to employers that second their employees to work
for charitable organizations.  An employee who is seconded would tem-
porarily provide services to a non-profit organization while still retaining
his or her position with his or her employer; compensation, either in the
form of a regular salary or a stipend, would come from the employer
rather than from the non-profit organization.  Seconding could alleviate
some issues currently faced by unemployed youth, who are unable to get
the training and experience they would generally receive during this
stage in their lives and therefore face the danger of becoming a “lost
generation,” one without the skills to progress in the workforce even as
the economy improves.  Currently, employers who second their employ-
ees may deduct the salaries of those employees as an ordinary business
expense;216 however, providing those employers with a tax credit, rather
than a deduction, would encourage even more employers to consider
seconding as an alternative to laying off underutilized employees.
By encouraging employers to send underutilized employees to work
for these organizations rather than laying them off, the government could
simultaneously provide assistance to charitable organizations and poten-
tially reduce unemployment, which is an increasing problem during a
recession.  For example, more than 1,288,030 layoffs were recorded in
2009, which was the most downsizing since 2002.217  The negative ef-
fects of unemployment on a worker extend far beyond the loss of in-
come; the unemployed also lose health benefits, feel stigmatized by
family members and peers, are unable to develop their on-the-job skills
during the time they are unemployed, and can suffer from depression
precisely at a time when their lack of healthcare leaves them least able to
216 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (permitting deductions on “all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses” including “a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered.”).
217 December Job Cuts: Lowest Job Cut Year Since 1997, THE CHALLENGER INDEX (Chal-
lenger, Gray & Christmas, Inc.), Jan. 2011, at 1.  Moreover, employees who lose their jobs
often remain unemployed for six months or longer. Id.
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afford mental health services.218  Moreover, such workers often have dif-
ficulty finding a new job, even after the economy recovers.219
On the other side, employers suffer when they are forced to scale
back their workforce.  Not only might they have to pay severance to the
workers who are let go, but employers may also suffer from lost morale
among their remaining employees.220  Once the economy recovers and
the employer begins to rebuild its workforce, it will face costs related to
finding and hiring qualified employees.  Moreover, the employer may
suffer a reputational hit after a layoff, as prospective employees may not
want to work for an employer with a reputation for downsizing.221
Taken together, these factors suggest that the best proposals from the
perspectives of both employees and employers are the ones that will pre-
vent or reduce downsizing in the first place.
Encouraging volunteering within the private sector is not a novel
concept; the ABA, for example, has encouraged attorneys to provide ser-
vices on a pro bono basis for years.222  Corporations could take a cue
from some law firms that have allowed incoming associates to work for
non-profit organizations in exchange for a stipend and other benefits pro-
vided by the firms.
A tax credit paid to employers who second their employees could
lead to a glut of paid volunteers and could leave non-profits with the
problem of how to effectively train and manage an increase in their
workforce.223  Conversely, these organizations may be less inclined to
hire paid workers if they feel they can receive those services for free; as a
result, individuals who are genuinely dedicated to working for charitable
organizations may find themselves squeezed out by self-interested work-
ers who return to the for-profit sector as the economy improves.  Despite
these concerns, an additional tax credit for companies who second their
workers may be worth considering as an effective means of combating
both the increased needs of the charitable sector during a recession and
the increased unemployment that is likely to occur during those times.
218 See, e.g., Elizabeth Landau, Unemployment takes a tough mental toll, CNN (June 15,
2012), available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/14/health/mental-health/psychology-
unemployment.
219 See, e.g., Winnie Hu, When Being Jobless is a Barrier to Finding a Job, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/nyregion/for-many-being-
out-of-work-is-chief-obstacle-to-finding-it.html.
220 See, e.g., Lauren Tara LaCapra, Layoffs Sweep Wall Street, Along with Low Morale,
REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/21/us-wallstreet-layoffs-id
USTRE77K1OU20110821.
221 See, e.g., Rules for Laying Off Employees, PAYSCALE.COM (April 21, 2009), http://
www.payscale.com/compensation-today/2009/04/rules-for-laying-off-employees.
222 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (“A lawyer should aspire to
render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year”).
223 See SCHIFF, supra note 208, at 60. R
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7. Conclusion
Of the proposals discussed above, converting the deduction to a
credit that is available to all taxpayers and providing a tax credit to em-
ployers who second their employees to charitable organizations appear to
have the greatest potential to alleviate the burdens faced by charitable
organizations during a recession.  However, these changes are not
enough to help all organizations in need, especially since most taxpayers
are unaware of marginal tax rates or incentives related to charitable giv-
ing.224  Moreover, taxpayers may be slow to respond to changes in the
charitable deduction, not only because of delays in communicating those
changes to the public but also because donors may need time to absorb
the full impact those changes will actually have on their finances.225  In-
stead, what is needed is the addition of direct governmental spending for
charitable organizations.
B. Direct Governmental Spending
One problem underlying all of the above proposals is that they rely
on taxpayer responsiveness to incentives to give.  Unfortunately, during
an economic downturn, taxpayers may be unwilling to make charitable
contributions because the incentive to give is outweighed by other con-
cerns about the economy at large.  As noted above, even a modest de-
cline in income can lead to a disproportionately large decline in
charitable giving, either because that decline in income has additional
consequences (like a change in income bracket or the loss of other de-
ductions, like the mortgage interest deduction) or because the decline is
accompanied by general uncertainty about one’s ability to meet
mandatory expenses in the future.226
Moreover, even if some donors independently attempt to counteract
the decrease in others’ donations, they may be unable to accurately gauge
the needs of charitable organizations.  This problem may be particularly
acute for hidden-need organizations, which may be unable to effectively
communicate to donors the increased demand that arises for their ser-
vices during a recession.  Ideally, donors would have complete informa-
tion regarding the needs of all charitable organizations and could direct
224 But see Charles T. Clotfelter and C. Eugene Steurle, Charitable Contributions, in HOW
TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 408, 436 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman, eds.,
1981) (citing MORGAN, DYE & HYBELS, RESULTS FROM TWO NATIONAL SURVEYS OF PHILAN-
THROPIC ACTIVITY (1979)) (“[I]t seems just as likely that many taxpayers, particularly
itemizers, use approximations and rules of thumb that render their behavior very similar, on
average, to a perfectly informed optimizer.”).
225 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 73–75 (finding that “taxpayers do not adjust to
changes in tax policy immediately, resulting in smaller effects in the short run than in the long
run.”).
226 See supra Part I.
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their funds to those organizations that they decided were most worthy in
light of all this information, but their giving is more likely based on erro-
neous assumptions about an organization’s true need or ability to survive
with reduced funding.  Many organizations will attempt to pull at donors’
heartstrings during times when the competition for funds is fierce, but
some appeals will inevitably be more effective than others.227
For all these reasons, attempts to stimulate charitable giving by do-
nors are insufficient during a recession and should be supplemented by
direct government spending.  The federal government can help stabilize
charitable budgets by providing direct relief during a recession in order
to counteract the reduction in charitable contributions that generally oc-
curs during those times.  Such measures would not be unheard of, given
that many countries have higher levels of direct governmental support of
charitable activities, oftentimes to compensate for the fact that they expe-
rience significantly lower levels of charitable giving.228
In order to retain the goals of subsidy and choice theory, any pro-
gram involving direct government spending should aim to preserve the
goals of limiting freeriding and allowing donors to express their prefer-
ences for organizations through their donations.  A system of govern-
ment spending may still preserve these goals if it is used simply to
supplement, rather than replace, the charitable deduction and if the sys-
tem continues to reflect the choices made by donors.  In particular, this
latter goal can be met by allowing charitable organizations to apply for
funding based on the level of donations they received in a previous year.
By requiring the amount of funding received to be pegged to the dona-
tions received in a previous year, governmental support can be used to
help a charitable organization retain the programs that had been previ-
ously been supported by donors who may no longer be able to provide
support during difficult economic times.
While some opponents of direct government funding of charitable
organizations argue that it would involve too much “red tape,” McDaniel
notes that the current system is hardly a model of efficiency itself, since
it requires the filing, processing, and auditing of tax returns.229  He also
notes that replacing the current system of deductions with direct govern-
ment spending would eliminate at least one form of waste, the ineffi-
227 See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531,
557–58 (2006).
228 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 3, at 97 (quoting Arthur Anderson & Company, Over-
view of governmental support and financial regulation of philanthropic organizations in se-
lected nations, in COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, 2 RESEARCH
PAPERS 2975 (1997) (“direct and indirect governmental support of the private philanthropic
sector varies inversely with the involvement of government itself in providing social
services”)).
229 McDaniel, supra note 14, at 389. R
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ciency that results from over reporting of donations.230  Turnier counters
that replacing the deduction with direct government grants would lessen
pluralism, in part because charities would be more susceptible to chang-
ing political winds.231  The deduction, “by resting on the choices made
by millions of Americans of very diverse backgrounds, facilitates support
for organizations which may not otherwise be on a favored governmental
list, and also insures against radical contractions of support to charitable
activities.”232
While Benshalom argues that “charitable relief has a unique politi-
cal function within the democratic decision-making process that cannot
be replicated by a direct government-spending program,” he ultimately
finds that direct government spending provides several advantages over
the charitable deduction.233  For example, Benshalom describes the large
role that fundraising plays in charitable organizations as a result of those
organizations’ reliance on private contributions, diverting resources from
the promotion of charitable objectives.234  He also notes that “because
contributions are voluntary and may fluctuate because of unpredictable
events, [charitable organizations] cannot make ambitious long-term plans
that are often necessary for optimally providing public goods.”235
Moreover, while such organizations may have lower bureaucratic
constraints than government, this lack of bureaucracy does not necessa-
rily guarantee efficiency.236  Whereas government employs certain
mechanisms designed to ensure accountability and transparency, charita-
ble organizations may be more susceptible to negative consequences like
nepotism, non-professionalism, and waste, particularly since they may be
reliant on a relatively small number of large donors.237  Finally, Ben-
shalom notes that some types of public goods, like disaster relief or com-
prehensive policy objectives, can be better provided through a strong
centralized government rather than through a series of discrete charitable
organizations.238  Even though individual donors may have better knowl-
edge than government officials about how to provide local public goods,
many are either unable or uninterested in determining the most efficient
ways to provide public goods on a national or international scale.239
230 Id. at 390.
231 William J. Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax Reform: The High Road and the
Low Road, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1703, 1723 (1986).
232 Id.
233 Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J.
1047, 1057 (2009).
234 Id. at 1070–71.
235 Id. at 1071.
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 Id. at 1071–72
239 See id. at 1072.
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While replacing the charitable deduction with a system of direct
government spending on charities runs somewhat counter to expenditure,
subsidy, and choice theories, supplementing the support provided
through the deduction with direct spending, particularly during an eco-
nomic downturn, may help charitable organizations “smooth out” their
budgets and weather the fiscal problems brought on by a recession.  Such
support may be particularly crucial for low-profile and hidden-need orga-
nizations that may be unable to survive without additional governmental
assistance.
IV. CRITICISMS
A. Additional Expenditures Will Hurt Economic Growth
Some may argue that government should not be increasing tax ex-
penditures or adding spending programs aimed at the non-profit sector
during a recession, when both the government and the private sector are
in dire need of financial help as well.240  With respect to tax expenditures
in particular, Surrey argues that, given the inequities, confusion, and ad-
ministrative difficulties surrounding tax expenditures, they should be
used only as a last resort.241
It is true that at least some of the tax expenditures proposed above
would cost more in foregone revenue than would be received in the form
of increased donations.  For example, the Congressional Budget Office
(“CBO”) estimates that extending the deduction to include all taxpayers
would cost the government about $5.2 billion, while increasing donations
by about $2 billion.242  However, the overall impact should be relatively
small, as the amount of federal revenue lost due to the charitable deduc-
tion constituted less than 1.7% of the total estimated federal tax receipts
in 2008, and there is little reason to believe the additional measures dis-
cussed above would have a significantly greater impact on the budget.243
Moreover, the current provisions related to charitable relief are consider-
ably smaller than other tax expenditures, such as the mortgage deduction
240 See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 14, at 4 (“All else equal, a government spending pro- R
gram is preferable to a tax expenditure program from a stabilization perspective.”).
241 Surrey, supra note 49, at 734; see also Patrick Tolan, Questioning Tax Expenditures
for Economic Recovery, 127 TAX NOTES 67, 70 (2010) (observing that tax expenditures are
“must pay” items that cannot be easily adjusted later and that such expenditures are generally
not subjected to the same congressional scrutiny as direct expenditures).
242 OPTIONS FOR CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 43, at 10 (using 2006 as a benchmark). R
Alternatively, combining this expansion with a $500 (for individual filers) or $1000 (for mar-
ried couples filing jointly) floor would lower the cost of giving to the government by $2.5
billion while still increasing donations by about $800 million.
243 Benshalom, supra note 41, at 1081 n.125 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
ERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2008, 239, 296–99 (2007)).
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and the exemption for health benefits.244  While we should always tread
lightly when dealing with tax expenditures, particularly during times of
economic crisis, the benefits to both the non-profit and for-profit sectors
of the expenditures outlined above seem to outweigh their costs.
B. Direct Governmental Support of Charitable Organizations Would
Increase Government Involvement in the Charitable Sector
Beyond its Already High Levels
The United States Government already contributes almost as much
to nonprofit organizations and activities as all private sources of philan-
thropy combined.245  As noted by the Filer Commission, “The more an
organization depends on government money for survival, the less ‘pri-
vate’ it is, and the less immune to political processes and priorities.”246
The Commission argued in 1975 that “no single institutional structure
should exercise a monopoly on filling public needs, that reliance on gov-
ernment alone to fill such needs not only saps the spirit of individual
initiative but risks making human values subservient to institutional ones,
individual and community purposes subordinate to bureaucratic conve-
niences or authoritarian dictates.”247  Furthermore, “government money
obviously comes with strings attached, however invisible and uninten-
tional they may be.”248  As a result, private support is often considered
crucial in maintaining a nonprofit organization’s independence.249
Schizer observes that the debate between direct government spend-
ing and private giving subsidized through a deduction resembles the de-
bate between governance at the federal level and governance at the local
level, “[E]xcept that here, of course, no government is making any sub-
stantive decisions, so that charity is even more flexible and local than
state and local governments.”250  In addition to providing greater compe-
tition, flexibility, and experimentation than direct government spending,
private giving allows charitable organizations to take advantage of local
preferences and information.251  Conversely, a centralized government
structure may be better able to screen out unsuccessful programs than
individual organizations, which may be hampered by a lack of coordina-
tion and communication.252  Finally, Schizer notes that “some public
244 See id.
245 See GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 16. R
246 Id. at 17.
247 Id. at 119.
248 Id. at 96.
249 See id. at 17.
250 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and
the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 243 (2009).
251 See id. at 244.
252 See id. at 244–45.
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goals involve network effects or economies of scale, so that the quality
of the program is enhanced by standardization and size.”253
In terms of minority decision-making, Schizer notes that our deci-
sion to support direct government spending or the current deduction re-
flects our view on government in general:
If we believe that elected officials have unique legiti-
macy as decision[-]makers, and that public goals need to
be pursued communally, then we are likely to worry that
donors, in allocating public resources, are usurping an
authority more properly exercised by government.  In
contrast, if we are skeptical about the government’s in-
clination and ability to reflect popular will, as opposed to
the agendas of interest groups and professional politi-
cians, then we are more likely to favor a robust role for
donors as a useful and legitimate complement to the
government’s efforts.254
Another argument against providing direct government aid to chari-
table organizations is that any attempts to aid such organizations at the
federal level will simply lead donors to scale back their contributions.
This phenomenon, referred to as “crowding out,” is best described by
Richard Steinberg: “The relationship between government spending and
private donations is not simple, but theory suggests that there will usually
be partial simple [crowdout]; that is, that government expenditure in-
creases (decreases) are partly neutralized by donative decreases (in-
creases).”  Studies of the crowding out phenomenon are inconclusive, but
at least some scholars suggest that fears of crowdout are overblown, per-
haps because individuals have their own, personal motivations for giv-
ing.255  For example, Tomer Blumkin and Efraim Sadka note that one
motivation for making charitable contributions is to demonstrate
253 Id. at 245.
254 Id. at 246.  As an alternative to direct government spending, Schizer proposes setting a
threshold number of donors that a charitable organization would need to have in order to be
eligible for tax-deductible donations; such participation requirements would “[make] it more
difficult for an idiosyncratic or self-interested donor to pursue an unwise idea with public
money.” Id. at 249.  (This problem is often referred to as the “ketchup museum problem”). Id.
at 230.  Alternatively, Schizer suggests the government could play a larger role in determining
funding for charitable organizations by offering greater tax benefits to particular causes that
are deemed high priority.  Such an approach would, according to Schizer, “reduce the risk of
allocation error and also could enhance legitimacy by constraining the discretion of wealthy
donors.” Id. at 251.
255 Richard Steinberg, Donations, Local Government Spending, and the “New Federal-
ism,” in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 143, 154 (Richard Magat
ed., 1989). But see CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 12 (1985)
(finding little evidence of crowding out in response to increased government spending).
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wealth.256  Similarly, Gergen notes that donors may be motivated by the
pleasure they get from voluntary giving, a pleasure that would be lost in
a system that substituted mandated government spending for a deductible
contribution.257
Even though any additional governmental involvement in the fund-
ing of charitable organizations gives some cause for concern by those
who wish to preserve the division between the two sectors, so long as
any increases in direct governmental spending are limited in time to peri-
ods of economic stagnation and are limited in scope to what is needed to
replicate historic levels of funding, then the benefits of such supplemen-
tal funding should outweigh the drawbacks.
CONCLUSION
As the debate continues about the effectiveness of the charitable
deduction in facilitating the relationship between the private, public, and
non-profit sectors, we should take a closer look at how these relation-
ships change during an economic downturn.  In particular, we need to
consider both how an economic crisis can negatively impact all the types
of charitable organizations and what we can do to alleviate those effects.
The most effective ways to stimulate charitable giving are to convert the
current deduction into a tax credit for contributions that is available to all
taxpayers and to provide employers with a tax credit for seconding their
employees to charitable organizations.  However, because such measures
alone may not be enough to assist low-profile and hidden-need organiza-
tions, we should supplement such efforts with direct government spend-
ing.  While all three of these proposals, as well as the others discussed in
this Article, have their drawbacks, the worst thing we could do at the
moment is nothing.
256 Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka, On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable Contribu-
tions 2 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies and Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1900, Jan.
2007).
257 Gergen, supra note 7, at 1407. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\22-3\CJP302.txt unknown Seq: 52  2-MAY-13 9:14
